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2Abstract
Croatia's  transition  toward  independence  and  the  market  economy  in  the  1990s
exacerbated  problems  in  the  PAYG  DB  system  and  ultimately  led  to  its  financial
collapse.  Although  a  comprehensive  three-pillar  reform  was  initiated  in  late  1995,
implementation  of  the  reform  only  began  in  1998  with  an  overhaul  of  PAYG
parameters,  including  shifting  to a  German-style  points  system.  Introduction  of the
mandatory  and voluntary  funded  pillars  was  announced  in  1998  and  implemented  in
2002.  The new  system  includes  a privately-managed  individual  account  scheme with  a
contribution rate of 5 percent in addition to a downsized pay-as-you-go,  defined benefit
component.  This paper  describes  the  design  of the  new  system  and highlights  areas
where further refinements are needed.Table of Contents
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5Introduction
Croatia's  transition toward independence  and the market economy m the 1990s  exacerbated
problems  in the PAYG DB  system and ultinately led to its  financial collapse.  Although  a
comprehensive  three-pillar reform was  initiated in late  1995, implementation  of the reform
only began  in 1998 with an overhaul of  PAYG parameters,  including shifting to a German-
style  points  system.  Introduction  of the  mandatory  and  voluntary  funded  pillars  was
announced  in  1998  and implemented  in 2002.  The mandatory  second  pillar is  organized
through individual  accounts  administered  by private  pension fund management  companies.
Individuals  can  select  their  pension  fund- and  switch  between  funds  as  they  choose.
Procedures  of  affiliation,  switching,  contribution  collection,  enforcement,  account
administration,  and reporting on individual accounts  are  organized  centrally, by the Central
Registry  of Affiliates  (REGOS),  a  second-pillar  clearinghouse.  Individual  accounts  in  the
second pillar will yield price-indexed  lifetime annuities.  While total pension  expenditures  in
the  next  40  years  are  expected  to  remain  above  10  percent  of  GDP,  gradually  two
mandatory  pillars  of similar  size  will  emerge.  Unless  the  second  pillar  contribution  rate
increases  from  the  current  5  percent  of  gross  wage,  combined  replacement  rates  are
expected to remain low  relative  to earlier  target  levels.  The  estimated  low burden of the
transition cost suggests  that it would be feasible  to introduce an increase  in the near future,
along with measures  to reduce  the  relatively high administrative  costs of the  second pillar.
The legislated fees for funded pensions  appear to be very high.  At the same time, complex
and rigid requirements  could act as a barrier to entry for potential fund managers.  This has
led  to  high  alministrative  costs  during  initial  implementation  relative  to  international
comparators.
There are  several lessons which  can be drawn from the Croatian  reform to date, which are
important despite being preliminary  . They include:
*  Combining PAYG andfundedpension reforms into a single reform "package"  can be useful in
building support for funded pension reform, particularly in countries where public faith
in the  first pillar  has been undermined.  It also  suggests that multi-pillar  reform can be
accomplished  in a fiscally challenging environment if there is sufficient adjustment in the
PAYG system;
*  use of a central clearinghouse, if well designed and executed, can assist in smooth and more
uniform implementation  of the second pillar.  It may also facilitate broader consolidation
in public revenue reporting and enforcement  that is desirable in terms of efficiency  and
transparency  in tax admimnistration;
*  the central  clearinghouse  and its protection of affiliate information  does  appear to have
minimized abuses in pension  fund management marketing seen in other funded pension
reforms.  At the same time, overall fee levels remain high due to the problems with fees
levels and structures;
*  use  of a  central  clearinghouse  does  not automatically  result  in  administrative  cost
savings if the legislated  fee  structure is incorrectly  and/or overly  rigidly determined.
The  Croatian experience  also  suggests that closer coordination  with fund managers
on  the  system  and individual  fund  manager  data needs  is  required  to  ensure  that
central  account  management  achieves  the  intended  economies  of  scale  and  not
merely duplication  of account management functions within the system;
6*  those designing reforms need to think through carefully the implications  offee schedule
design for portfolio  concentration  and unintended  barriers  to entry for potential  fund
managers.  Concems  on  possible  portfolio  concentration  incentives  may  be
particularly  important  for  countries  such  as  Croatia  which  have  small  and illiquid
equity markets and still-developing local long term debt markets;
X  a contribxt6ion rate of 5 percent of payroll as in Croatia should be considered very much
a lower bound for a multi-pillar system to provide a minimum acceptable  aggregate
replacement rate from a second pillar; and
*  the Croatian  experience  does not offer clear guidance on the  ningle or multkle regulator
question  to date.  However, broader  assessment of financial market  and contractual
savings regulation in  Croatia suggests  that medium term consolidation  of regulation
for  contractual  savings  at  least  may  be  desirable  in  a  small  country  with  limited
regulatory capacity.1. Introduction and Macroeconomic  Background
1.1 Introduction
This paper describes  and analyzes the multi-pillar pension reform implemented in Croatia in
the late  1990s.  It also includes long term forecasts  of the new system.  The structure of the
paper is as  follows:  Section 1 describes macroeconomic  developments  in Croatia  in the last
decade, which  form an important backdrop to the pension reform.  Section 2 describes the
evolution of the PAYG system in the years leading up to the  first pillar  reform.  Section  3
summarizes  the overall  concept of the  multi-pillar reform legislated in  1998  and 1999,  and
details the key elements of the 1998 PAYG reform.  It also  outlines the initial impact of the
reform  and  extemal  factors  influencing  the  financial  position  of the  first pillar in  the  late
1990s.  Section 4 then describes  in detail the main features of the funded pillars which came
into force in 2002, and identifies  key issues in system design which are likely to need  further
attention  from  policy  makers.  It  also  describes  market  developments  in  2001  and 2002
leading  up  to  the  introduction  of  the  funded  pillar  and  the  initial  experience  in
implemnentation.  Section 5 then gives forecasts of the impact of PAYG and funded pension
reforms,  and  implications  for  the  future  structure  of  the  pension  system.  Section  6
summarizes the main findings and outstanding issues in each pillar which are likely to require
further  adjustments  in  the  system in  coming  years.  It also  outlines  main  lessons  of the
Croatian reform relevant for other would-be pension reformers.
1.2 Macroeconomic  background
This  section  discusses  macroeconomic  and  fiscal  developments  in  Croatia  in  the  1990s
which  together  with  growing  dependency  rates,  contributed  significantly  to  the  need  for
reform  of the  pension  system.  Following  independence,  Croatia  experienced  transition
hampered by both conflict and a period of hyperinflation.  Macroeconomic  stability, initiated
with  the  Stabilization  1993  Program,  coupled  with  the  resumption  of peace  in  1995,
contributed to a strong revival of economic activity.  Inflation remained on average around 4
percent  thereafter.  The  recovery  was  driven  by  rising  domestic  demand- - a  surge  in
consumption  and investment for reconstruction.  In the period following the end of the war,
this  surge  in  domestic  demand  was  financed  by  repatriation  of  capital,  primarily  from
deposits  held  abroad  by  expatriates.  Deposit  repatriations  through  the  banking  system
triggered  a  bank-lending  boom,  which  led  to  growing  external  imbalances,  as  imports
increased rapidly.'  Lack  of fresh investment  capital contributed  to  sluggish  exports,  that,
accompanied  by an expansion of imports, produced  a large current account deficit,  reaching
its  peak  in  1997.  Initially,  the  current  account  deficit  was  financed  by  capital  inflows.
However,  after  1997,  these  inflows  declined  significantly  and were  replaced  by increasing
external debt  (further spurred by Croatia receiving an investment credit rating in 1997)  and
by privatization  revenues.  As a result,  external  debt more than doubled  in only  six years  -
rising from 25 percent in 1994 to almost 60 percent of GDP in 2000. 2
1 An additional factor that contributed to the surge in irnports was the advancement of purchases  to
avoid the 22 percent VAT introduced in January  1998.
2  The stock of end-1994  external debt to GDP ratio is corrected by the latter recognition of the Paris
and London  Club debts (1995-1996).
8Table 1.1: Selected  Macroeconomic  Indicators, 1994-2001
1994  1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
GD]' per capita, current USD  3,137  4,029 4,422 4,398 4,805 4,371  4,153 4,402
Real GDP growth, % rate  5.9  6.8  5.9  6.8  2.5  -0.9  2.9  3.8
Real GDI growth,  % rate  ...  ...  32.9  32.4  -7.4  -7.9  -10.3  14.7
Real pnvate consumption growth, % rate  ...  ...  -0.2  13.6  -0.6  -2.9  4.2  4.6
Consurner price index, p.a., %  97.5  2.0  3.5  3.6  5.7  4.2  6.2  4.9
Labor productivity in industry, pa, % change  3.0  6.6  11.3  11.9  8.7  3.9  4.3  9.6
Avetage monthly gross wages,  pa, % change  ...  34.0  12.3  21.0  12.6  10.2  7.0  3.9
UneinpLoyment rate (LFS), pa, %  ...  ...  10.0  9.9  11.4  13.6  16.1  15.8
Current account balance, % of GDP  4.9  -7.5  4.8  -12.5  -6.7  -7.0  -2.4  -3.2
Expenditures  & net lending of CGG, accrual, % of 44.1  48.9  51.9  51.3  54.0  57.2  54.2  53.4
CGC; balance (ind. Arrears)  (%o  of GDP) a/  1.5  -1.4  -2.2  -3.1  -2.2  -8.4  -7.0  -6.8
Total public debt, % of GDP b/  22.2  19.3  31.6  35.8  42.6  54.0  61.2  64.5
a/  Excluding privatization  receipts. Includes  central budget,  extrabudgetary funds, road agencies and
local govt.b/Indudes publicly guaranteed debt and arrears.
Source: C.entral  Bureau of  Statistics, Croatian  National  Bank, MoF, Institutefor  Payments and  staff  calculations.
Monetary tightening in  1998, combined with the unfavorable  external  environment,  led to a
surge in real interest rates and depressed economic activity.  The banking crisis that foLLowed
and  the  outbreak  of hostilities  in  Kosovo,  all  contributed  to  the  1999  recession.  The
expansion  of fiscal revenues  ended in  late  1998,  while  expenditures  continued  to expand.
The delicit of the Consolidated  General Govermnent rose to more than 8 percent of GDP
in 1999, once payment arrears were taken into account as expenditure items.  The deficit was
in  major  part  financed  through  privatization  receipts  coming  from  the  sale  of Croatian
Telecorm.
After elections  in January 2000,  the new Govemment realized  that rising public debt ratios
and  tvwn  deficits  were  likely  to  make  access  to  external  financing  more  costly  and  less
abundant,  while  the use  of privatization  receipts  to  finance  deficits  was not a viable  long-
term  strategy.  During  late  2000,  the  Government  initiated  a  set  of  reforms  aiming  at
reducing the deficit and the overall tax burden.  The consolidated central government  (CCG)
expenditures  were  reduced  by more than  5  percentage  points  of GDP. Nevertheless,  the
EBFs - pension  and health  funds in particular  - still  ran a  significant deficit  that was  only
partly  offset  by  a  higher  surplus  in  the  central  government  In  fact,  during  2000  overall
extrabudgetary  spending  (pensions,  health,  child,  unemployment  benefits  and  water
management)  surpassed  the share of "core" state budget spending in overall CCG spending,
a dramatic  change  from  the position  in  the mid-1990s  when  core  spending accounted  for
almost 60 percent of CCG (Figure  1.1.).
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Driven  by private  consumption  and some recovery  in  exports,  the  economy pulled  out of
recession in 2000.  While consumption  expansion benefited from a large public sector wage
increase in  1999,  exports also improved,  helped by  a recovery in Europe and real  exchange
rate depreciation.  Tourism revenues  surged  as a result of improved  political  stability in the
region.  All this reduced the current account deficit to its lowest level in the last seven years.
The Croatian  economy  expanded  by 2.9  percent in 2000  and 3.8  percent in 2001,  despite
weaker external demand.
The  banking  sector  recovered  from  its  ctisis  and  confidence  in  the  banking  system
strengthened considerably.  International reserves grew to record highs, partially due to euro
conversion  (approximately EUR 2 bill entered the banks as household deposits at the end of
2001)  (Figure  1.2.).  Moreover,  the  country  took  steps  toward  closer  integration  with  the
world economy, which induded:  (i) completion of WTO membership;  (ii) trade concessions
from the EU; (iii) signing some 30 free trade agreements which became effective in 2001  and
2002, including with  CEFTA countries;  and  (iv)  successfully  negotiating  a  Stabilization and
Association  Agreement  with  the  EU.  Notwithstanding  these  positive  developments,  the
official  unemployment  rate  remained  high  at  around  22  percent  in  2001  (15.8  percent
according  to  the  ILO  definition),  due  mainly  to  rigidities  in  the  labor  market  and
unsatisfactory  progress  in  enterprise  restructuring.  While  private  consumption  remained
strong, imports  of machinery,  equipment  and  intermediate  goods,  together  with increased
lending activity to enterprises, also indicated growth of private sector investments.
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Source:  Central Bureau of Statistics, Croatian National BankFiscal  polhcy  played  an  important  role  in the  Government's  stabilization  efforts,  as  fiscal
deficits  were kept below  three percent of GDP until a sharp  deternoration at the end of the
1990s.  Strong revenue  performance in the period between  1994 to 1998 was the key  factor
behind the  Government  ability  to keep  the  deficit low.  While this was positive,  economic
growth combined with  modernization of the tax system resulted in a CGG revenue/GDP
ratio which was the highest level among European transition countries.3
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The strong  expansion  of public  sector  spending  was partly due  to the  need to strengthen
public  administration  and  to  allocate  resources  to  the  war  and  post-war  reconstruction
effort.  Total  CGG  spending increased  sharply  from 39  percent of GDP  in  1991  to  49
percent  by  the  end  of the  war  in  1995,  and  further  to  57  percent  in  1999.  The  first
expansion occurred  despite a steep reduction in the real value of pensions and public sector
wages -- the two anchors of fiscal stabilization policy.  Post-war fiscal expansion has created
additional  atypical  types  of spending not  experienced  by most transition  countries  - social
spending linked to the war, reconstruction  costs, and spending to meet other special interest
group demands.  As a result, the post-war  expansion of social spending offset the reduction
in military  spending  (Figure  1.3.).  The  level was  much  above  most  developed  transition
countries,  but also well above the majority of developed industrial countries'  spending.  The
trend  was  also  unfavorable,  as  Croatia  was  increasing  instead  of  decreasing  its  overall
3  Tax  reforms  included  broadening  of tax  bases,  introduction  of new  taxes  (VAT,  road  charges,
share in public enterprises' profit, local surtax etc.),  and sirnplification of tax administration.
12spending, in contrast  to its neighbors.4 Successive  tax reforms,  aligning Croatian tax system
to  iatemational  standards,  have  succeeded  in  improving  tax  administration  and  revenue
mobilization,  turning  Croatia  into  one  of  the  highest-taxed  econornies  in  the  region.
Howev-er,  as mentioned  above,  the  1999  recession  put an  end  to  the revenue  expansion,
showing  the fragility of the heavily taxed private sector.
Table 1.2: Consolidated General Government finances  by  level
1994-2001 (Accrual Basis)
As a  percentage of GDP
___  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
Total revenue and grants I/  45.6  47.5  49.7  48.3  51.8  48.8  47.2  46.7
o/w Budgetary Central Gov.  26.1  27.8  28.5  27.2  30.8  28.4  27.4  29.7
o/w Extrabudgetary  funds  15.6  15.3  15.5  15.4  15.2  14.7  14.3  11.0
- Pension Fund  8.1  8.6  8.7  8.6  7.5  7.4  7.3  3.5
- Health Insurance  Fund  4.3  4.6  4.8  4.7  5.9  6.0  5.8  5.8
o/w Local Government  3.9  4.4  5.7  5.7  5.8  5.5  5.3  5.7
Total  expenditure  and  net  44.1  48.9  51.9  51.3  54.0  57.2  54.2  53.4
lending
o/w Budgetary Central Gov.  23.6  26.5  25.6  24.1  25.1  25.9  23.9  25.9
o/w Extrabudgetary  funds  16.9  18.3  20.6  21.6  23.0  25.0  24.4  20.0
- Pension Fund  7.6  9.0  9.7  11.1  11.8  14.0  12.7  7.7
- Health Insurance Fund  6.0  7.2  8.6  8.0  8.8  8.6  9.3  7.9
o/w Local Government  3.7  4.2  5.7  5.7  5.8  5.9  5.1  6.6
Overall deficit/surplus  1.5  -1.4  -2.2  -3.0  -2.2  -8.4  -7.0  -6.8
o/w Budgetary Central Gov.  2.5  1.4  2.9  3.1  5.7  26  3.5  3.8
o/w Extrabudgetary funds  -1.2  -3.0  -5.1  -6.1  -7.9  -10.3  -10.1  -9.0
- Pension Fund  0.5  -0.4  -1.0  -2.5  -4.2  -6.5  -5.4  -4.2
- Health Insurance Fund  -1.7  -2.6  -3.9  -3.4  -2.9  -2.6  -3.5  -2.2
o/w Local Government  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.4  0.2  -0.9
Source:  World  Bank  estimates  for  general  government  (CG,  EBFs  and  agencies,  LG,  Bank
Rehabilitation  Agency and Croatian Pnvatization  Fund)  based on cash data from the MoF, adjusted
for net increases in arrears.
Notes: 1/ Excludes privatization receipts considered as a financing item below the line.
Caveats:  The  CG  has  been absorbing  the  financing  of some  EBFs.  In particular,  since  1994,  the
Road  Fund,  and since  1998 the  Child's  and the Water Management  fund have  been financed  from
general revenues. Also,  from July 2001  the CG has further absorbed pension spending.  Had it not
been fox  these changes,  the total revenues of the EBFs as a share of GDP would have been relatively
stable throughout the 1994-99 period -at around 15.5 percentage points of GDP.
4  See World Bank, PEIR  (2002). Some differences in the data in the PEIR and this document arose
from availability of updated information  and inclusion of four additional government  agencies  into
the CGG definition.
13Figure 1.4  Structure of current transfers of CGG (2001)
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Note: Total amounts to 18.8% of  GDP
Source: Ministry of  Finance  and WB estimates.
Analyzing  the  economic  classification  of fiscal  spending,  current  transfers  were  the major
factor behind the expansion  of public spending.  Current transfers  grew  by as much as 135
percent in real terms between  1994 and 2001.  In 2001, current transfers  on an accrual basis
stood at 18.8  percent of GDP.  The expansion  of current transfers  has  mostly been  driven
by the pension  and health  sectors.  These  two  funds  have  combined for a total expansion
equivalent to 8.8 percentage points of GDP between 1994 and  1999, of which more than 6.3
percentage points were due to the Pension fund and 2.5 to the Health fund.
Rising  central  government  surpluses  have  only  partially  compensated  for  the  increasing
deficits  of the EBFs, resulting in an increase  in the total deficit.  Pensions  currently absorb
72.5 percent of total CGG current transfers.  The  share of state budget in current  transfer
payments has been mcreasing from 1.1 percent of GDP in 1994 to 9 percent in 1999 and 8.6
percent  in  2000,  meaning  that  the earmarked  funds  simply  could  not cover  expenditures.
However,  most  of  the  increase  is  a  consequence  of  either  changes  in  legislation  or
government  decisions  to  "rehabilitate"  selected  sectors  or  enterprises  through  payroll
contribution waivers.'  Since 2001, the situation has worsened further, with an additional CG
annual transfer  totaling  1.2  percent of GDP to the Pension  Fund required  by  the law on
pensioners'  debt restitution adopted by the Parliament in December  2000  as the reaction to
the Constitutional Court decision  on the need to compensate  pensioners  for freezing  wage
indexation during the Stabilization  1993 Program (see Section 3.4 for further discussion).  6
5  The  legislative  changes  indude:  the abolishment  of the  contributions  to the  child fund and the
water  management  fund;  as  well  as  provisions  contained  in  the  so-called  "small  pension  law"
establishing  the repayment of the merit pension  transfers  that have been  retained by the CG during
the war time (for further details see Section 3.4).
6  Law on eliminating  differences  in pension  levels  acquired in  different  periods,  Official  Gazette,
127/2000
14The  fiscal  consolidation  that started in 2000 has succeeded  in lowering general government
spending to some 53  percent of GDP in 2001  from  57 in 1999.  However,  this expenditure
level and the high fiscal deficit are still threats to macroeconomic  stability and further reform
steps have to be taken to put fiscal policy on a sustainable path.  A credible  fiscal adjustment
requires  sustainable  changes  in  fiscal  policy,  as  opposed  to  unsustainable  cuts  in public
investrnent  and  non-wage  current  expenditures  as  observed  in  the  past.  This  implies
sustainable  reductions  in transfers  and  the public  sector  wage  bill.  Since  transfers  to the
Pensio.n  and  Health  funds  constitute  an important  part  of the  total  transfers,  sustainable
reductions  in  these  areas  cannot  be  realized  without  the  implementation  of  structural
reforms.  Reform of the two  sectors, therefore,  has become cntical  element of expenditure
reduction  efforts.  As  Croatia  moves  closer  to the  EU,  fiscal  consolidation  effort will  be
paralleled  by the  need to budget  for  the costs  of EU  accession.  Therefore,  the  pension
system cannot expect savings  from other sectors to cover its deficits, but will need to realize
its own savings  coming from further  1S" pillar adjustments.  The early evidence  of the reform
of the pension  system  suggests  some  promising developments,  visible in a strong revenue
performance and slowing of the growth of new pensioners(see Section 3.3. for more details).
The  following  section  describes  in  more  detail  the problems  of the pension  system  in the
1990s which necessitated the comprehensive reforms introduced at the end of the decade.
2. The Croatian PAYG System in the 1990s
Prior  to 1998,  the pension system  in CroatLa  was  a pure PAYG system organized  in  three
separate funds (workers,  self-employed  and farmers) which differed only in formulas applied
with regard to the  determination  of benefits.  Eligibility and benefits of privileged categories
(WWII  participants,  active  military  and  police  personnel,  academicians,  Homeland  war
veterans,  ex-political  prisoners,  former JNA  personnel,  etc.)  were  determined  by  specific
laws.
Similar to other PAYG systems in the region,  the Croatian system  featured low retirement
ages  (60 for men, 55  for women),  full old-age pension enitlement based on 40 and 35 years
of serv-Lce  for men and women  respectively  , and various  supplements  to years  of service
irrespective  of contributions  actually  paid  (additional  service  for bodily  injuries, hard work
conditions,  special  privileged  occupations,  doubling  the  service  period  for  veterans  and
political prisoners).  During the 1990s, external conditions worsened with the war, recession,
privatizatLon  and  economic  restructuring.  Along  with  generous  policies  for  accessing
pensions, the pension  system was unable to sustain this range of negative shocks.
After achieving  independence  in 1990,  the pension/GDP  ratio in Croatia declined  rapidly
from  10 to around  7 percent in  1992.  War and economic  decline in that period induced  a
large  decline  in  real  wages  and,  due  to  prevailing  wage  indexation  of  pensions,  a
corresponding decline in real pensions.
However,  from 1994  onwards, there was a rapid increase  in the pension/GDP  ratio, which
rose  to  more than  13 percent in  1999.  For most of that period, total spending within the
PAYG system was significantly  higher than pensions-only  spending due to health insurance
contribution  obligations  of  the  Pension  Fund.  By  the  time  those  obligations  were
transferred  to the general  budget  financing  in  1998,  core  pension  spending  had stabilized
15around  13  percent  of GDP.  Table  2.1  tracks  the evolution  of pensions  spending in  the
1990s, as well as other key data on the system.
Figure 2.1  Pension Fund versus pension expenditures
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Table 2.1: Pension System Indicators
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  000  2001
Expenditures for pensions as
% of GDP  9.9  10.1  7.3  7.3  7.2  8.5  9.3  10.7  11.2  12.8  12.4  13.2
Total Pension Fund outlays
as % of GDP*  11.3  10.8  7.7  8.5  9.7  10.8  11.4  12.5  12.0  13.3  12.8  13.6
Insured to Pensioners  3.00  2.56  2.23  2.14  1.97  1.81  1.66  1.59  1.54  1.38  1.36  1.36
-Pensioners to Insured  0.33  0.39  0.45  0.47  0.51  0.55  0.60  0.63  0.65  0.72  0.74  0.74
Age dependency  ratio**  2.97  2.89  2.83  2.77  2.71  2.66  2.82  2.99  2.98  2.97  2.94  2.94
Net replacement rate, %/o***  75.3  62.8  63.2  61.8  52.5  45.9  45.8  47.0  46.8  44.6  42.9  47.6
Contributors, 000  1,969  1,839  1,725  1,698  1,622  1,568  1,479  1,469  1,472  1,406  1,381  1,402
Beneficiaries,  000  656  720  775  795  825  866  889  926  955  1,018  1,019  1,032
-0/w old age****  321  353  400  419  440  443  458  478  495  518  532  540
-o/w disabi]ity****  166  183  183  182  186  190  191  198  201  235  237  238
-o/w surivors****  168  184  193  193  191  191  192  199  206  210  213  217
ension benefit, HRK  3.6  5.1  21.1  325.1  655.2  834.  932  1117.41255.9  1363.1 1426.2 1685.7
et wage, HRK  4.8  3.1  33.3  526.4  1247  1818  2033.  2377  2681  3055.  3324.4 3541
Source:  Central Bureau of Statistics, Pension Insurance  Fund
*including overall  spending on pensions and administration  cost of the Pension Fund
**20-60 year-old,  over more than  60 year-old;  ***average  net old-age  pension  as a percentage  of average  net
wages;
****Excluding  military beneficianes.
16Figure 2.2  System versus old age support ratios
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As  noted in  Section  1, the  rapid  expansion  of pensions  spending was  not matched  by an
increase  in  contribution  revenues,  resulting  in  increasing  deficits  financed  by  general
revenues.  The deterioration  in the financial  position of the system was largely driven by a
substantial shift in the system dependency ratio, which began  in the 1980s and accelerated in
the  1990s (see Figure 2.2).  Between  1980 and 1990, the SDR deteriorated  from 4 to 3,  and
experienced  an  even sharper  decline  from that point to reach  1.36 by 2001.  As Table  2.1
and  Figure 2.2  show, the  deterioration was  driven  both by a large  fall in contributors  - of
over  28 percent between  1990 and 2001  - and by a dramatic rise in pension  beneficiaries  -
by almost 60 percent in the same period.  What were the key factors driving these trends?
In many  countries,  demographic  trends  have been  significant  factors in increased  pressure
on the pension  system.  While  the same is true  for Croatia  over  the long  term - with the
share of population  over 55  expected  to increase  from 25 to 40 percent between  1995 and
2035,  and  the  age  dependency  ratio  deteriorating  from  close  to 3  to around  2  in 2035  -
Figure  2.2  indicates  that  the  deterioration  in  the  SDR  in  the  1990s  was  not  due  to
demographic  factors in any significant measure.
The major factors leading to the declining SDR were general economic deterioration and the
impact  of  the  war,  with  both  effects  compounded  by  Government  policy  responses.
Specifically,  the main influences were:
17*  A rising unemployment rising from  11.1  percent in  1990  to around 22 percent in 2001,
with  an increase  of around  60 percent between  1996  and 2000  alone.7 This  trend was
accompanied  by  increased  informalization  of  the  economy  as  a  result  of the  war,
exacerbating the decline of the contribution base;
*  Use of the pension system to deal with surplus workers  through use of pension history
"buy-outs"  for  older  workers  in  companies  undertaking  "restructuring"  or  where
production  ceased  due  to  war  activities,  as  well  as  easier  access  to  civilian  disability
pensions.  This  practice has  continued under the  current  Government,  for example  in
dealing with the recent retrenchment of 13,000 employees  In the Ministry of Defense;
*  The  effects  of the war  on the  number  of privileged  (or merit)  pensioners  and military
disability  pensioners.  While  this was  to  some  extent  an  unfortunate  and  unavoidable
consequence  of the conflict,  less than  stringent assessment procedures  almost certainly
made the inflow of these groups  higher than was warranted (especially during 1995 - the
end of the  conflict).  By end  1999,  almost  20 percent  of pensioners  were  receiving  a
privileged  pension  (see  Table  2.2  for  a  breakdown  by  the  11  categories  of privileged
pensioners).  Despite  the overall  fall in the number of merit pensioners, in expenditure
terms  the new pensioners  (Croatian army and Croatian  defenders)  added more than the
savings from the fall in the old types of privileged pensioners";
*  In 1999,  a spike in new mostly early retirees and disability pensioners, as people "rushed
to pension"  to lock  in their entitlements  under the  pre-reform  system  (see Section  3.3
for more details).
Table 2.2: Number of privileged pensions by category
1998  1999  2000  2001
WW II veterans  76,636  73,466  72,382  70,712
Police  12,791  12,816  13,679  14,257
xecutive Council of Sabor  144  126  125  100
Croatian Academy of Science
and Arts  87  79  81  82
Croatian Homeland war
veterans,  1941-45  35,614  34,090  33,932  32,788
x Yugo-army soldiers  16,667  16,217  15,784  15,467
litical prisoners  3,972  5,668  5,976  5,893
arliamentarians  119  112  119  121
Croatian Army  2,237  2,364  2,769  3,783
roatian defenders  22,612  26,110  28,551  29,300
Ex Yugoslav pensioners  26,959  25,325  5,126  4,871
TOTAL  197,838  196,373  178,524  177,374
7 Like most SFRY systems, registered  unemployment was  considerably higher  than unemployment
measured in labor force  surveys following ILO definitions  (see Table  1.1).  However, LFS data show
a similar rising trend in the second half of the 1990s.
8  In  1998,  the share of merit pensioners  was  21 percent  of total beneficiaries,  while their benefits
amounted  to 20 percent of total  pension spending.  In 2001,  17 percent of pensioners  received  19
percent of total pension spending.
18TIhe  combined  impact of these policy  measures  can be  seen  in average  years  of service  at
retiremLent  for both old age and disability pensioners  in the  1990s.  For old age pensioners,
this  fell from around 34 years  on average in the  early  1990s to 27 years  in  1995,  before  a
rebound  to  31  years  by 2001.  For disability  pensioners,  average years  of service  at initial
entirlernent  fell from around  25 years  in the early  1990s  to only  21  years in 1995,  before  a
partial rebound to 23 years by the end of the decade.  9 Furthermore,  around 20 percent of all
pensioners  acquired the pension benefit with less than  19 years of service.
As  government  policy  worsened  the deterioration  of the SDR, it further exacerbated  the
financial  impact on the system of a tising net inflow of pensioners  through complementary
policy  choices  on  financing,  both  on  the  revenue  and  expenditure  sides.  The  most
problernatic  policies  - most of which  the new  Government which  took office in 2000  has
subsequently revised or eliminated - were:
*  ],xtensive  use  of  contributions  exemptions  not  matched  by  any  reduction  in
entitlements.  Exemptions were used not only for the military and police, but also as  a
public  subsidy  for "rehabilitation"  of selected  industries  such  as shipyards.  One of the
largest groups to benefit from this was war veterans and survivor families  10;
*  High levels of privileged  pensions, which increased  the financial  pressure of high inflow
in this group.  This was both a financial and an equity issue, given the disparities between
privileged  and  regular  pensions.  Overall,  privileged  pensions,  including  pensions  for
disabled  war veterans  and survivors of war veterans from the Croatian  Homeland War,
cosit  around 2.2  percent  of GDP  annually.  Average  pensions  among  some  privileged
categornes  are  over  four  times  those  of  regular  old  age  pensioners,  and  privileged
disability pensions almost three times higher than for civilian disabled."l
*  Exemption of certain types of income from the taxable base for contributions, including
honoraria, per diems etc.1 2; and
*  Failure  to  adjust  the  minimum  taxable  income  for farmers'  and  the  self-employed  to
reflect nominal wage growth, which has made those part of the system less sustainable.
Apart firom these policy-induced  financial problems, the Croatian system has been subject to
problems of compliance for social contributions  typical of many transition economies.  This
has been  particularly pronounced  among farmers and the self-employed, whose compliance
9 See Ainual Statistical Reports of the Croatian Pension Fund.
10  The  new  Government  has  addressed  such  problems  to  a  substantial  degree.  It has  stopped
contribution  waivers  on specific  sectors  such  as  shipyards,  in  part to honor WTO  commitments
against  hidden  subsidies.  From  October  2001,  it  also  eliminated  payroll  tax  exemptions  for war
veterans  and survivor  families.  These measures  are expected  to increase pensions revenue  alone by
around  250  mnln.  kuna  annually  for  rehabilitated  companies  alone,  or  around  2  percent  of
2001contribution revenue.
"1  Effective from 2002, the Govemment has reduced average  privileged pensions under considerable
public  pressure  by  8  to  20  percent  (with  higher  percentage  reductions  for  those  on higher  level
pensions), while also capping them.
12  Several  attempts to address  this issue were unsuccessful, in part because the groups most affected
induded  journalists,  academics  and  others  with  high  public profile.  The  Government  submitted
amendments to indude these income  sources in the taxable base in July 2002.
19rates  have  been very  poor, despite  the  decline in  the real value  of their minimum  taxable
income.
One area  of pensions  policy that ran somewhat  contrary to trends elsewhere  in the  system
was  net replacement  rates  (NRP)  (see Figure  2.3).  At the end of the  1980s, the NRP was
almost 80  percent,  driven by the generous  accrual  and indexing  rules of the  SFRY system.
The combination of hyper-inflation  in the early 1990s, indexation procedures  which delayed
pension  adjustments  by two months  and within-month  delays  in pensions  payments  drove
the NRP down to 60 percent at the end 1993 when the stabilization program was launched.
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The  price  indexation  of pensions  introduced  at the  time  further  drove  down the  average
replacement  rate to 46  percent  in 1995-96.  By 2000,  it had declined  slightly  further to 43
percent, before rising to almost 48 percent in 2001  due to the impact of pension increases  in
response  to  Constitutional  Court  decisions  (see  Section  3.4  below  for  details  on  the
decisions).  Overall  the trend in NPRs in the past decade has been downward.  The use of
combined price/wage indexing of pensions (see Section 3.1)  should continue in the long run
to drive NPRs down, provided  that further legally-mandated  compensatory  adjustments  in
pensions  do not offset the likely trend in "core" pension rates.
20Table 2.3: Revenue structute of the Pension Fund
1994  S  c  2001  Structure
(000 HRK)  (%)  (%°)
Payroll
contributions  8,040,501  96.6  13,261,258  57.63
Nontax revenues  281,335  3.4  71,485  0.31
Transfers from
the State
Budget  3,152  0.04  9,602,313  41.73
Capital revenues  0  0.00  75,433  0.33
otal  8,324,988  100.00  23,010,489  100.00
The  shaLre  of contributions in total revenues of the Pension  Fund was around 97 percent in
1994, while  there  was  almost no  transfers  from the  budget.  Although  pension  earmarked
payroll taxes, currently at 19.5 percent on gross earnings,  are relatively high by international
standards,  revenues  from contributions  covered  only sixty percent of  pensions  spending in
2001.13  The  financing  gap  is  covered  by the  State  Budget.  State  Budget transfers  to the
Pension  Fund reached  close  to  6  percent  of GDP  in 2001,  or about  42 percent  of total
Pension  Fund's  revenues.  Although  from July  1, 2001  most of the payments  and revenue
collection has been handled through the Treasury, the conclusions are the same.
13  Pension contrbution  of 19,5% of gross wage  covers risks of old age, disability and death and is
split  between  employees  (10,75%)  and  employers  (8,75%).  From  2002,  second  pillar  contribution
(5%)  is paid  from  the  employee's  part  Employers  are  responsible  for  calculating,  transferring,
administering and reporting  for both parts of the pension  contribution  rate.  Self-employed  pay the
same  contribution  rate  on  a  prescribed  contribution  base.  Although  there  is  no  ceiling  on
contributions,  there are announcements  that a ceiling could be introduced in 2003.
21Table 2.4: Transfers from the State Budget
(000 HRK)  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001*
Regular  transfers  as  %  oA  0.0%  0.3%  1.0%  2.2%  2.2%  2.1%  2.1%  2.5%
GDP
Transfers  for insurance of  3,152  5,150  8,300  10,000  8,800  10,280  13,652  14,371
dependent  artists
Transfers  for insurance of  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  399,732  517,000  602,001
farmers  and priests according
to the new Law on Pension
Insurance
Transfers  for disability and  ...  ...  ...  1,028,319  1,341,283  1,196,633  1,367,000  2,022,845
families' pensions
Transfers  for merit pensions  ...  280,000  1,100,000  1,619,130  1,617,413  1,368,270  1,466,400  1,626,941
Pensioners 'Debt  0.0%o  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.4%  1.2%  1.1%  2.3%
Restitution as % of  GDP
Reconciliation  of pensions  (so  ...  ...  ...  ...  591,997  1,750,000  1,750,000  1,723,638
caled  "Small Pension Law")
Law on Debt Restitution  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  2,121,411
(eliminating differences in
benefits  acquired in different
periods)
Additional transfers for  0.0 %  a0o%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  1.1%  1.3%  a0.9
covering PFdeficit as % of
GDP
apital transfer - buying out  ...  ..  ...  ...  ...  1,503,000
PF portfolio
Compensation for a reduction  ..  . ...  ...  ...  ...  760,000  600,000
of contribution rate
Payment of arrears  . ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  1,294,570  891,106
TOTAL  3,152  85,150  1,108,300  2,657,449  3,559,493  6,229,135  7,168,622  9,602,313
As  % of GDP  0.00  0.29  1.03  2.15  2.59  4.37  4.55  5.68
* estimate based on Pension Insurance Fund and the Ministry of Finance  data.
Source: Ministry of Finance
The  State  budget  is  liable  to  cover  the  costs  of merit  pensions,  war  veterans  and  their
survivors'  pensions,  subsidized  pensions  for  farmers  and  priests,  as  well  as  insurance  of
independent artists.  New types  of high benefits  with relatively  loose eligibility  criteria  were
introduced  for  war  veterans  and  their  families  in  1997  that resulted  in  approximately  I
percent of GDP of additional expenditures per annum.  At the same time, the Constitutional
Court  ruled  in  favor  of pensioners'  associations  that  challenged  government  policies  to
compress  replacement rates  and price indexing benefits.  As a resuk, since  1998,  restLtution
payments have been introduced, which have contributed to expand pension expenditures by
an additional  one  percent of GDP  in  1999, and  through  the  second  Constitutional Ruling
again  by  an  additional  1.2  percent  of  GDP  in  2001  (see  Section  3.4  for  more  detailed
discussion of the court decisions).
223. Pension Reform Concept and PAYG reforms 1999-2001
3.1 History of the three pillar reform
The history of multi-pillar pension reform in Croatia leading up to its  fuDl  implementation in
2002  is  one  of false  starts  and delays  driven  by various  fiscal  and  polhtical  considerations.
The  first  mention  of pension reform  in  Croatia  dates back  to the stabilization  program  of
October  1993.14  The stabilization program  was designed  as  a three-stage  program, with the
first stage involving a multiple shock-therapy of exchange  rate adjustment,  monetary policy
actic.n,  and wage-pension  restraint  based on an anti-inflationary program.  The second and
the third stages, anticipated  for implementation  during  1994-95, involved a set of structural
reforms,  including  the pension  reform,  aimed  at eliminating  inflationary  pressures  in the
long-run." 5 It was  argued  in the  program that structural  reforms were needed  if long run
econonuic  stabilization  was to be achieved.  However, in practice successful  elimination  of
hyperinflation  in  only  one  month  was  not  followed  by  implementation  of the  reform
prograrn  at the anticipated  speed.  In  the pension  field,  the  first stage of the stabilization
prograra  included  a  shift  from  wage  to  price  indexation  of pensions.  Rapidly  faling
replacement  rates  in  1994  should  have  been  justified  with  a  comprehensive  three-pilar
pension reform program, but this did not occur.  Instead,  during 1995 the country directed
large  resources  to  military  activities  associated  with  the  conflict  which  further  delayed
structutal reforms.
A  three-pillar  pension  reform  concept  was  first  announced  at  the  end  of  1995  at  a
conference  where the government presented  forecasts indicating the emerging PAYG  crisis
and the measures  that needed to be taken to achieve  long run sustainability  of the pension
system."6 The basic concept envisaged  a change in PAYG parameters aimed at downscaling
the  first pillar and its gradual and partial  substitution with  a mandatory  fully-funded  pillar.
The program also anticipated  introduction of a voluntary,  fully-funded  pillar.  The timetable
for  refomi, as presented by the Govemment, included enactment  of  three-pillar legislation
in  1996  and its  implementation  from  1997.  During 1996, work began on pension  system
17 forecasting, and  drafting of legislation, with the aim of enactment  by the end of that year.
First pillar reform was scheduled for the beginning of 1997, while second pillar contributions
were  expected  to start  flowing  from  mid-1997.18 The  semi-annual  estimated value of the
14  See Anusic, Rohatinski, and Sonje, eds.,  1995.
15  Specifically,  the  second  stage  included  a  series  of  financial,  market,  legislative  and  public
admninistration  reforms,  while  the  third  stage  comprised  more  complex  social  reforms,  such  as
pension and health reforms and  fiscal decentralization.
16  The conference in Opatija was organized by the Government of Croatia,  the World Bank and the
East-West Institute. Proceedings  are published in Ministry of Finance  (1997).
17  Activities  regarding pension forecasting (applying the PROST model framework to Croatia), initial
legal  work on  funded pillars  and  annuities,  conferences  induding  Opatija,  training and  specialized
consultancy were  financed  from the Japanese  Grant to the Public Sector Adjustment Loan  (PSAL)
requested  by the  Government of Croatia  from the World Bank to support health  reform,  pension
reform,  public  finance  reform,  and social  assistance  reform.  Although the loan  was  never realized,
the funds from the grant played an important role in organizing the preliminary work on pension and
other reforms in the period 1995-1997.
18  A  second  pillar  contribution  rate of 10  percent  of wage  (out of a then  total of 25.5  percent
pension  contribution)  was proposed.  Such a relatively  high second pillar  contribution rate and the
23transition  cost  was  mcorporated  into  the  1997  draft  Budget.  However,  during  budget
preparation  in autumn of 1996, other  fiscal pnorities were set and the pension reform was
postponed  for  the  first  time.  This  led  to  suspension  of technical  preparations  for  the
pension reform pending "better times".
Despite price  indexation  of pensions,  the financial  situation  of the pension  system  further
deteriorated in 1997 due to rapid  decline of the contributor/beneficary  ratio, and it became
clear that urgent measures  were needed to prevent the  collapse  of the pension system  (see
Section 2 for details).  In early 1998,  a government Plenipotentiary  for Pension Reform  was
established  with  two  working  groups,  legal  and  economic,  which  restarted  the  technical
preparations for systemic pension reform.19
In July  1998,  the  Parliament  enacted  the  Pension  Insurance  Act,  the  first  in  a  series  of
legislation  aimed  at  setting  the  framework  for  the  new pension  system in  Croatia.20 The
Pension  Insurance Act stipulated that the pension  system in Croatia would consist of three
pillars - a downscaled PAYG, DB pillar;  a mandatory  fully-funded DC pension pillar; and a
voluntary  fully-funded  DC  pension  pillar.  Changes  in  the  existing  PAYG  system  were
scheduled to commence in January 1999,  with the introduction of the funded  pillars to start
in January  2000.  The  funded  pillars  were  to  be  regulated  in  more  detail  by  laws  to  be
enacted during the remainder of 1998.21
The  more  detailed  framework  for  funded  pensions  was  outlined  in  the  draft  Law  on
Mandatory  and Voluntary Pension Funds  (hereafter  "Funds Law"), which was submitted to
the Parliament in September  1998.  Based on expectations  that the law would be passed  by
the end of 1998, the proposal was to launch the second pillar in January 2000.  However, in
the second reading the Parhament requested more details  on the integrated vision of the new
pension  system,  including  the  draft  Law  on  Pension  Insurance  Based  on  Individual
Capitalized Accounts  (hereafter  "Annuities Law"),  and individual examples  and calculations
of future pensions.  After  reviewing the requested materials,  the Parliament finally enacted
the Funds Law  in May  1999.'  However, it also delayed  implementation  until July 2001  to
take account of delays in passage of the Law and the time required to build the infrastructure
for the implementing and regulating the funded pillars.
The Funds Law obliged insured individuals  below the age of 40 as of  July 2000 to contribute
at  least  5  percent  of their  gross  wage  to  an  individual  pension  insurance  account  in  an
accompanying  transition  cost  were  expected  to  be  sustained  by  restrictive  fiscal  policy  and
privatization revenues (Ministry of Finance, 1997).
19  Decree of the Government  on Establishment of the Plenipotentiary for Pension Reform,  Official
Gazette, 27, 1998.
20  Pension Insurance Act, Official Gazette, 102, 1998.
21  It was interesting that at the same  session, the Parliament passed a Law on Pension Restitution  for
the period  1993-97, which was a reaction to the Constitutional  Court ruling against introduction of a
price  indexation  of pensions  in  1993  (see  below).  While  the Pension  Insurance  Act  tightened  the
PAYG  parameters,  the  so-called  "Small  Law"  worked  in  opposite  direction.  In  the  debate,  the
contradcctory  nature  of the two  laws  was  never  discussed,  which  can  be  partly  attributed to  the
exclusive  focus on the 1998 World Cup in football and the success of the Croatian national team.
22  Law on Mandatory and Voluntary Pension Funds,  Official  Gazette, 49, 1999.
24authorized  and  licensed  private  mandatory  pension  fund.  The  remaining  pension
contribution  would  continue  to  be  paid  to  the  Pension  Institute,  the  PAYG  benefit
provider. 3 In addition,  employees  between  age  40  and  50  as  of July 2000  were  given  a
choice to join the new multi-pillar system or remain only in the first pillar.
In October  1999, the Parliament completed the legislative package for pension reform with
enactment  of the  Annuities  Law.24 This  law  regulates  various  elements  of the  funded
pension  pay-out  phase,  including  establishment  and  other  relevant  issues  for  pension
insurance  companies;  determination  of eligible  pension  products  from  second  and  third
pilLar  accounts,  the  structure  of  pension  programs;  supervision  by  the  Agency  for
Supe.rsion  of Pension  Funds  and Insurance  (HAGENA);  investment limits  for  actuarial
reseives; bankruptcy procedures; and guarantees in the payout stage.  The law was scheduled
to become  effective  in January  2000, in order  to allow  establishment  of pension  insurance
compaIies before the establishment of voluntary pension fund management companies.5
In terms  of the institutional framework  for funded pensions,  the Agency for Supervision  of
Pension  Funds  and  Pension  Insurance  (HAGENA)  was  established  in  1999  as  a  new
regulatory  and  supervisory  institution  for  the  accumulation  and  the  payout  phases  of the
funded  pension  system,  subordinated  to the  Parliament and to a  large  extent independent
from  the  Government  Likewise,  REGOS  (the  Central  Registry  of  Affiliates)  was
establishled in  1999 with the primary  task of administering  affiliation,  switching,  reporting,
collection  and  account  services  for  second  pllUar  members.  Introduction  of required
monthly reporting on second pillar contribution by REGOS was used to spread the synergy
of monthly  reporting  onto  other  payroll  taxes  and  surtaxes  aiming  at  improvement  in
compliance  rates and reducing the reporting burden  for the employers.  Further discussion
of the roles of each institution is in Section 4.
With  the  appointment  of the Director  of the  Central  Register  of Affiliates  (REGOS)  in
October 1999 and the Director of HAGENA and other board members in November 1999,
the  institutional  prerequisites  for  launching  the  funded  pension  pillars  were  established.
However,  political  events  at  the  end  of  1999  and  elections  in January  2000  froze  the
administrative  preparations  for  introduction  of  funded  pensions  and  induced  a  second
postponement  of second pillar implementation.  After an extended period of consolidating
the  new  Government  - which  was  also  accompanied  by  appointment  of new  heads  of
HAGENA  and  REGOS,  the  legislation  was  amended  in  order  to  delay  further
implementation  of the second pillar  until January  2002.26  The amendments  allowed for  18
months  to elaborate  several  aspects  of the  new  system, induding the supplementary  legal
23  The  Law  stipulated that the second  pillar  contribution  should  be "at least"  5 percent  of gross
wage,  inmplying  that  the  actual  rate  should be  determined  periodically  in  the  annual  budgetary
process.
24  Law on Pension Insurance Based on Individual Capitalized Accounts, Official Gazette,  106, 1999.
25  The Funds Law stipulates that voluntary pension  funds must indicate pension program which an
individual  will be eligible for after the accumulation phase. Pension program can only be prepared by
pension  msurance compames.
26  Law on Changes  of the Law on Mandatory  and Voluntary  Pension  Funds  (Official Gazette,  63,
2000)  and  Law  on  Changes  of the  Law  on  Annuities  (Official  Gazette,  63,  2000)  were  aimed
primarily  at postponing introduction  of the second pillar (for the third time).
25framework  for  establishment  of  fund management  companies;  investment  and marketing
regulations  for  private  pension  funds;  the  institutional  framework  for  registration  of
individual  memberships;  efficient  collection  of  contributions  and  their  transfer  into
individual accounts  with  accompanying  data on funds  collected.  From the  second half of
2000,  preparation  for funded  pension implementation  began in earnest,  as outlined in more
detail below.
3.2. Reform of PAYG parameters
The changes introduced to the PAYG system in 1998 were far reaching and targeted several
major  sources  of  fiscal  pressure,  including  normal  and  early  retirement  provisions,  and
benefit calculation  and indexation.  The  changes introduced  in the PAYG pillar with the
Pension Insurance Act of 1998 included:
1.  Gradual (semi-annual)  increase  in retirement age  for men  from 60  to 65
years and from 55  to 60 for women.  Starting from 2000, the retirement age  is
being raised  by 6  months  each  calendar  year.  Hence,  the  retirement  age would
reach the level of 65 (men) and 60 (women) in 2009.27
2.  Reducing work-period entitlement  and eliminating  entitlement by length
of career.  An insured person is entitled to old-age pension  only upon reaching
the retirement  age and having completed at least 15 working years.  Individuals
with less than  15 years  of work career are no longer covered.'  In addition, the
common ex-Yugoslav right to acquire  an old-age pension with 40 years of service
for men and 35 for women was cancelled.29
3.  Revisions  in early retirement entitlements,  including a gradual increase in
minimum early retirement age  from 55 to 60 for men and from 50 to 55 for
women,  changing early retirement entitlements,  and increasing the annual
27  Increasmg retirement  age raised a numerous  debates  and reactions at all levels.  The first draft law
submitted to the  Parliament included a proposal  to equalize  the retirement  age  at 65  for both men
and women. Despite the strong arguments behind it, including the large difference in life expectancy
at retirement between men and women of dose to 8 years and  practice in most EU countries, the
debate in the Parliament led to a swift replacement of that proposal with the current  retirement  age
of 65  for men  and  60  for women.  Although  the  Government's  development  strategy  document
(Potocnjak  et  al.,  2001)  envisaged  equalhzation  of the retirement  ages  for men  and women,  such
initiative was not launched until end-2002.
28  The criterion  is years  worked rather than  years  for which  pension contribution  has  been paid,
which has recently been  recommended  under the proposed  changes of the  Pension Insurance  Act.
There are no indications  on how many contributors  would  have  to  drop  out of the  system if the
proposed changes would be introduced.
29  As an exception  in the transition period  until 2009,  an insured person  can acquire  entitlement to
old-age pension  after  having  completed  40  (35) working years  and reaching  age  as  defined  by the
early-retirement scheme.  Also, during the transition, an insurance period of up to 5 years  is added to
an insured woman who  has completed less  than 40 working years  when determining  the amount of
the old-age  or  early retirement  pension,  in  such  a way that the  total  of effectively  completed  and
added working years  may amount to  a maximum  of 40  years.  These transitional provisions  aim to
equalize female and male pensions  and adjust them in accordance with the old formula.
26decrement  for  early  retirement.  An  insured  person  is  entitled  to  early
retirement  pension at the  age of 60, after completing  35 years of service  (men),
or at the age of 55 following the completion of 30 years of service (women).  The
transition period assumes an increase  of early-retirement  age from 55  (men) and
50  (women)  at the rate of 6 months  per year until 2009.  The  early retirement
annual decrement was  also raised  from  1.33 percent  to 3.6 percent per year of
early retirement.30
4.  Gradual widening  of the calculation  period from 10 best consecutive  years
to  full  career.  Strengthening  the  link  between  contributions  and  benefits
required widening of the calculation  period.  After an initial proposal to include
the  full  career  into  the  formula  immediately,  a  more  gradual  widening  was
legislated.3"  Starting from 2000, the calculation  period has been raised by 3 years
per calendar year, and will reach full career by 2008.
5.  Change in the PAYG benefit formula. The old formula with generous accrual
rates  was  effectively  suspended  by  the  benefit  calculation  procedures  of the
Pension Institute, and finally replaced by a "Gernan point formula" from  1999.32
Personal  points  indicate  the proportion  of an  individual's  wage  relative  to the
national  average  wage  for  the  calculation  period  extrapolated  to  the  whole
working  period.33 The pension  factor  is  a  parameter  determining  the  type  of
pension  and the  rate of reduction  from  the  old-age  pension,34  while  the actual
pension  value  is a parameter  that establishes  a monetary value  for  one year  of
service of an average earner  (Table 3.1).35
For those  insured  in both  mandatory  pillars,  a  two  part  formula  would  apply.
For years of service in the old system, a "German point formula" would be used
in the same way as for those remaining only m the first pillar.  First pillar benefits
30  Initial actuarial analyses  based on Croatian mortality  tables and the experience of other countries
indicated  that the annual decrement should be set at 5 percent or more.
31  Initial  calculations  indicated  that  immediate  widening  would  lead  to  a  reduction  in  newly
determined benefits of more than 20 percent  in the first year.
32  Accrual  rates  were 2.2  percent  per year  of service  for men and 2.5 percent  for women  like in
other  transition  economies.  Effective  accrual  rates  were  suppressed  to  below  2  percent  for
calculating  initial  benefits  through  less  than  wage  valorization  using  "internal  wage  coefficients"
calculated  by the Pension Institute.  In  other countries,  similar effective reductions were achieved by
capping benefit levels.
33  In 2002,  the average  personal point  is  determined  for calculation  period of 19  consecutive best
years, an(i  then multiplied by the total years  of service.  For an average  earner, the effective  accrual
rate is hence set at 1 percent per year of service.
34  The  pension  factor  for  the  old-age  pension,  early  old-age,  and  disability  due  to loss  of work
capability  is  1.00; for disability  due to loss of professional  capability is 0.6667;  for  disability due to
loss  of professional  capability  caused by work  injury is  0.5;  for professional  disability paid during
employment is 0.3333; and for survivor pensions between  0.7 and 1.0, in proportion to the number
of dependent survivors.
35  The initial APV was set by the Government at 35.16 (Official Gazette,  31, 1999)  which was a level
that yielded a smooth transition from  1998  to 1999 pensions.  Initial pensions  in January  1999  were
on average similar to iniital pensions in December 1998.
27in the new  system - the  so-called  "basic  pension"  - consist of two  tiers.  The
first is earnings-related  years of service based on a "German fornula", while the
second tier is a flat-benefit - years of service related:
Basic pension= 0.25* APV*PP*PF + 0.0025*WAGE(98)*YRS  (1)
where  APV  is  actual  pension  value,  PP  personal  points,  PF  pension  factor,
WAGE(98)  is average  wage in  Croatia in  1998 indexed  at the same  rate  as  the
APV,  and YRS  is  years  of service  in  the new  system.  For the  average  earner
participatmng  in both mandatory pillars,  the total accrual rate from the first pillar
in the new system would  stand at 0.5 percent  , i.e.  about  50 percent lower than
the  accrual  rate  for  those  participating  in  the  first  pillar  only.  However,  the
combination of the second pillar annuity and the basic pension from the reduced
first  pillar  is  expected  to  yield  higher  aggregate  pensions  in  the  long  run,  as
shown in Section 3.3.
6.  Introduction of the Croatian version of "Swiss indexation"  for both initial
benefit  valorization  and post-retirement  benefit  adjustment.  During  the
period of designing  the PAYG reform,  there was a strong sensitivity to the issue
of indexation.  This  was  partially  due  to the emerging  issue of the  "pensioners'
debt",  but  also  to  the  view  that  current  pensioners  should  have  stable
replacement  rates  based  on  their  "accrued  rights"  within  the  system.  After
suspension  of wage  indexation  in  1993,  a  period of price  indexation  in  1993-
1997, and  the Constitutional  Court ruling in  1998,  the pressure  to restore  wage
indexation collided with an initial  proposal in the Pension Insurance Act to have
initial benefits  valorized  to wages  and  benefits  paid  indexed  to prices.36 This
proposal was labeled as  unfair since it implied declining replacement  rates at the
speed of real wage growth and absolute differences among pension cohorts.37
36  For a more detailed discussion on Constitutional  Court externalities see Section 3.4.
37  The  debate  was  known  as  the  "debate  of three  retired  school-teachers"  who  retired  in  three
consecutive  years  with  same  work  and  earnings  history.  The  three  of them  meet,  start  discussing
pensions  and identify that the one who retired most recently has nominally higher pension than  the
other two  (due to wage growth  incorporated in determination of initial  benefit and price indexation
afterwards).  The Croatian  public viewed  this  as  unfair  and  a widespread popular  opinion  that they
should all have the same nominal pensions prevailed.  Accordingly,  establishing and maintaining such
"equity"  in  nominal  pensions  required  policy  makers  to  set  an  identical  indexation  rule  for
valorization  and  indexation.  Since  both  valorization  and  indexation  at  wages  would  fix  the
replacement  rates  and yield  fiscal  expansion  of PAYG,  while  on  prices  it would  cause  rapid  and
unsustainable  decline  in  replacement  rates,  the  mid-solution  was  to  have  both  valorization  and
indexation  at  50  percent  prices  and  50  percent wages.  A wide  consensus  was  reached  over this
formula,  commonly  labeled  in  Croatia  as  a  "Swiss-formula"  referring  to  the  practice  in  the  Swiss
PAYG.  However, the actual Swiss practice is to valorize at wages and index 50 percent  at prices and
50 percent  at wages,  which implies  that given wage growth, replacement  rates  would  fall  faster than
in Switzerland.  It would  thus be more appropriate to label a practice of both valorizing and indexing
benefits at 50 percent  wages  and 50 percent  prices as a "Croatian formula".
28Table 3.1. Summary of pension contribution, determination and  indexation mles in
multi-pillar pension system from 2002.
Older than 50 and  Below  40 and 40-50 in 2nd
40-50 in Ist pillar only  pillar
Contributions  19.5%  to 1st pillar38 14.5%  to 1st pillar
5.0%  to 2nd pillar39
Determination/  Actual pension value  (APV)  * personal  Actual  pension value  (APV)
valorization  points * pension factor  * personal  points  * pension
factor (for service in the old
system)  +  basic  pension
(service  in  the  new  system)
+ second pillar annuity
Minimum/  Minimum  pension:  0,825%  of average  no minimum  and maximum
maximum
benefit  gross  1998  wage  for  each  year  of  benefits service.
Maximum  pension:  3,8  average
personal pQints per year of  service
Indexation  APV = (50%W+50%P)  APV = (50%W+50%P)
Pension = (50%W+50%P)  Pensions  from  the  1st
pillar= (50%W + 50%P)
Annuity = CPI
The nominal  equality  of pensions  appeared  to be the most important factor in the
indexation debate in the Parliament which requested that the Govenmment propose a
more equitable indexation  pattern.  Finally, a consensus was reached to valorize  the
initial  benefits  at  arithmetic  mean  of growth rate  of wages  and  prices,  and  as  to
introduce  the  same pattem  for pension indexation.4'  Such  a decision  will  result in
lower  initial  replacement  rates  which  will  decline  slower  than  under  the  initial
proposal, but for the average life expectancy it would also yield a lower benefit" 4
7.  Miniimum and  maximum pension.  A  service-based  minimum  pension  was
introduced  instead  of  the  former  means-tested  mimmum  pension.  It  is
calculated  at 0.825 percent of the average  1998 gross  salary of all employees  for
each  working  year.42 This  high  accrual  rate  for  the  minimum  pension  was
38  Pension contribution is split between  employees  (10.75%) and employers  (8.75%).
39  Second pillar contribution is entirely paid from the employee's share of contribution  rate.
40  It is interesting that in the indexation debate in Croatia the outcome of "receiving most when you
die" was far less relevant than the "equality  factor".
41  The  simulations showed that the impact of such an indexation pattern would be stronger decline
in pension/GDP ratio, which indicates that those  remaining only in the  first pillar would have been
better off  with the initially proposed indexation pattern.
42  Minimum pension for a beneficiary of a disability pension, whose disability is the consequence  of
an occupational injury or  disease, as well as of a beneficiary  of a survivors' pension after the death of
29increased from the initially proposed 0.5 percent per year of service between the
two readings in the Parliament.  The effect of such a generous minimum pension
was  observed  in 1999  and  2000, when 45 percent  of new beneficiaries  (57,000
beneficiaries)  became  eligible  for  a  minimum pension.43 By  2008, which is  the
end of the transition period, the  share of new pensioners  on minimum pension
could grow to more than 60 percent, which would be fiscally unsustainable in the
long run in the  absence  of further  reforms.'  As  a  result, the Government  has
been considering  alternatives  for  dealing with  the  overly generous  formula  for
minimum  pension, both  within the  pensions  system  and with  reference  to  the
social  assistance  system.45 Similarly,  a  service-based  maximum  pension  was
introduced instead  of a maximum pension set if nominal terms  and determined
in  relation  to  average  pension.  Maximum  pension  applies  only  for insured
individials who remain in the  first pillar only and is admmistered  by capping the
average  personal points  at  3,8 for each  year of service.'  Individuals insured in
new two-pillar system are not subject to maximum pension.
8.  Disability and survivors pensions.  The  Pension  Insurance  Act  introduced
several  changes  and  restrictions  to  the  system  of  disability  and  survivors
pensions.  Pension  disability  benefits  based  on  remaining work  capability  (e.g.
right for a compensation during a waiting period to be retrenched to an adequate
work  by  the  PI),  wage  compensation  during  temporary  disability,  and  shorter
work  period  right)  which  imposed  serious  administrative  and  organizational
burdens  on  the  Pension  Institute  were  abolished.47 In  the  new  multipillar
system, disability and survivors pensions remain purely under the PAYG regime.
For  individuals  that  participate  in  both  mandatory  pillars,  the  law  envisages
the insured person,  which was  the consequence  of occupational  injury  or  disease,  is  calculated  at
0.825  percent  per year of the  average  1998  gross salary  for 40 years  of insurance periods,  adjusted
according to the same formula as the actual pension value.
43  Introduction  of the service-based  minimum pension  has  been particularly  beneficial for farmers
and  the  self-employed  whose  benefits  almost  doubled.  The  average  minimumn  pension  in  2001
increased by close to 50 percent.
44  Since  the minimum pension  has been  entirely  financed  from  the pension system budget,  such a
high level  of redistribution  adds  to deficit  in the future.  Although  the minimum  pension  does  not
apply to new two-pillar participants, it wllU  continue  to be in effect in the next 50 years. Simulations
show that the percentage  of new entrants  eligible for the minimum pension approaches  50% in the
15-year period.
45  After abandoning  the idea  to re-establish  an annual accrual  of 0.5 percent  for the entire work
history, the approved revision in 2002 was  substantially diluted and applied only for service above 30
years.
46  On  the other hand,  contribution  base has  not been  limited which lead  to a significant  actuarial
imbalance  for  high-income  earners.  The  new  legislation  on  contribution  collection  in  2003  is
expected to introduce maximum contribution base.
47  For example,  the  retrenchment right put the Pension  Institute in the  position of trying to find
employment  for the individual,  while requiring  a significant  network to evaluate  the remaining work
capacity  and  determine  adequate  job  for  each  individual.  Not  surprisingly,  a  right  to  receive  a
compensation  during  the retrenchment period,  under responsibility  of the PI, made  the individuals
passive  and led to abuse of the system.
30application  of the  better  of PAYG  disability  or survivors  pension  or a  regular
two pillar benefit, i.e.  the sum of basic  pension and  a lifetime annuity.  In cases
where  a  PAYG  benefit  is  applied,  total  accumulation  on  the  second  pillar
account would be transferred to the institution managing the PAYG scheme.
3.3 The impact of PAYG reforms, 1999 - 2001
The  1998 reform  of PAYG parameters  is expected to result in a gradual decline in the  first
pillar:  spending as a  share  of GDP from the  current  13.6  percent (including  administrative
costs)  to 10  percent  (11  percent with  the basic  pension)  in 2020  and  6 percent  (8 percent
with  the  basic  pension)  in  2040,  creating  space  for introduction  of the  second pillar,  as
shown  in Section  5.  The main  short to medium  term  savings in  the PAYG system  come
from a slower inflow of pensioners and the reformed indexation  pattern.  In the longer run,
reducecl PAYG benefits (basic pension) would also be a significant source of savings.
As  discussed  in  Section  2,  the  initial  fiscal  outcome  of the  1998  reforms  was  quite  the
opposite of what was expected, with the pension/GDP ratLo rising to well above  13 percent
of  GDP.  Such  an  outcome,  however,  emerged  from  raising  replacement  rates  due  to
policies  exogenous  to  the pension  reform package,  namely  the  "Restitution  Law"  of 1998
(known  as  the  "Small  Law")  and the  "Debt Repayment  Law"  of 2000.  Since  the bulk of
PAYG savings will not commence  for around 10 years, the main immediate outcome  of the
PAYG restructuring was stabilizing the total number of pensioners at around 1 million in the
period 1999-2001.  The main driving force behind this result was a reduction in the number
of new beneficiaries  after the  spike  in  1999.  Figure  3.1.  demonstrates  that 1998  and 1999
were  the years  of the  "rush  to pension"  in which  a large  number  of new  entrants  were
registered.  In  1999,  the  total  of 82,604  new  entrants  was  dominated  by  new  disability
entrants  (37,112),  mainly  due  to  elimination  of pension  benefits  based  on  the  remaining
work capability and their translation into regular disability pensions.
31Figure 3.1  New pensioners  between 1987 and 2001
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While  the inflow of old-age and  early retirement beneficiaries  started  gradually  declining in
2000 and 2001, the inflow of new disability beneficiaries  declined sharply to a historical low,
partly  due  to  the  spike  in  1999,  but  mnainly  due  to  restrictive  conditions  for  disability
eligibility set in the 1998 Pension Insurance  Act.
The  1998 reforms are also expected  to have significant  equity impacts  through reduction in
the number of old age pensioners with official incomes below the poverty line.  Whether the
measures related to the minimum pension that drive the equity improvement are sustainable
within the pension system remains  an open  question, but the immediate impact on old age
poverty is quite significant, as outlined in Box 3.1.
32Box 3.1; Equity dimension of  the pension  system in  Croatia
Despite  the  current high levels  of spending on pensions  and budgetary  transfers  to the system,
the  Croatian  pension  system  prior to the  1998  reform  was  not effective  in  reducing  poverty
arnong  elderly.  This  was  partly due to  its  basic  social  insurance  nature and  partly to specific
design features of the entitlement structure.  On one hand, more than one third of the population
age 60 and older did not receive  any benefits from the system in 1998.  For half of those who did
I receive a pension,  their monthly benefits were below HRK  1000, i.e., below the absolute poverty,
leveL  This  situation was less severe in practice,  as  only 20 percent of those receiving pensions in
2001  were below the absolute poverty line, the result in turn of increase in benefits  arising from
the aforementioned  Constitutional Court ruling (see Section 3.4).
Although the  1998 PAYG reform will not eliminate the inequities  generated  by the existence  of
privileged pension  groups; it will improve  the  situation of those  at the bottom of the pension
distribution.  The combination  of new indexing rules  (50 percent  wages  and 50 percent  prices)
and the setting of a new minimum  benefit per year of service, will combine  to eliminate poverty
altnost  completely among  those covered  by the system.  Projections  indicate  that only about 2
percent of the workers who will  retire in 1999-2008  and only 1 percent  of those retiring  during
2009-2018, will  be below the poverty  line.  However,  the new eligibility criteria  will only slightly
reduce  the  share  of those  who  do  not  receive  benefits.  Simulations  that  combine  this  small
expansion  in the number of eligible beneficiaries  with  expected increases  in minimum  pensions
show that the share of the elderly that either do not receive  a pension, or receive  a pension below
the poverty line will drop  from almost two thirds in 1998, to about 30 percent by the year 2008.
i Thlis  share will  further  shrink to 20 percent  by 2018.  In  summary,  the implementation  of the
i  pension reform will be a major step towards reducing poverty among the elderly.
3.4 External factors affecting PAYG finance during 1998-2001
There were additional factors which impacted on the PAYG system between 1998 and 2001
and whlch had important implications for the financial position of the PI.  These increased
incentives  to  delay  the  introduction  of the  second  and  third  pillars  by  exacerbating  the
financing gap in  the first pillar.  The  first was additional  financing  obligations  imposed as a
result of'  Constitutional  Court decisions related to the operation of the pension system in the
mid-1990s.  The second was a cut in payroll  contribution rates for both health and pensions
which  took  effect  from June  2000.  The  first  issue  created  significant  and  long  term
obligations  for additional  compensatory  spending  on pensions.  The  second  resulted in  an
additional financing gap for the PI which was not resolved in the anticipated manner.
The Constitutional  Court decisions were based on two sets of claims.  The first was that for
some years after the 1993 stabilization program, the Budget did not transfer the amounts due
to the pension  system for "merit"  pensions."  The  second  was that both valorization  and
indexing  should  have  been  done  on  the  basis  of changes  in  wage  levels  throughout  the
48  Merit pensions  are benefits  attributable  to periods  of covered service  (in  some  cases,  at  higher
than nor3nal accrual rates)  for which contributions were not paid - for example, time spent in WW II
milhtary service.
331990s,  rather  than  the  ad  hoc  price  level  changes  in  effect  from  October  1993  through
1998.49
With respect  to non-payment  of merit  pensions  from  the budget,  revenues  to the  PI were
15-20 percent less than would  otherwise have been available  throughout the mid-1990s, and
benefits were  held down to fit within the reduced tighter fiscal envelope.  For some  of the
period, the Government paid  eligible pensioners Budget-financed  supplements.  Eventually,
these were converted into ptoportional benefit increases and transferred to the contribution
base  for financing.  By  1997, the Budget resumed transferting resources for merit pensions.
The Constitutional  Court  held that the  compression  of merit pensions  was not  adequately
addressed  through  the special  supplements  and that  compensation  payments  were  due  to
merit pensioners.
The Government at the time dealt with the Constitutional  Court decisions on merit pensions
by enacting limited retroactive payments  for eligible pensioners  during the period 1993-1998
when the Budget failed to transfer the due money to cover merit pensions.  This was the so-
called "Small Law" restitution.5 0 It entitled  eligible pensioners  to an additional 100 kuna plus
6  percent  of their benefits  from July  1998  through  end 2002.  The  cost of the  Law was
around  1 percent  of GDP annually m the penod.  As of mid-2002, preparatory  work had
begun  on a new law which would extend the payment of the Small Law restitution  beyond
the  original end-2002  date, though  at this point it remains unclear for how long or at what
level.
With respect to the valorization and indexing issue, the Constitutional Court held that price
indexing  introduced  in  1993  was  invalid  on both procedural  and  equity  grounds.  In  the
Court's  view,  all  benefits  in  payment  status  or  awarded  before  January  1999  should  be
adjusted  for changes  in wage levels since  October  1993.Y  As a result, the Government that
took office in 2000 committed itself to payment of restitution on this second set of claims,
with payments  initiated in January  2001.52  Total payments amount to around HRK 23  bln
cumulatively between 2001  and 2010, or around  1.2 percent of GDP in 2001  to around 0.7
percent of GDP in 2010.  The demographic  profile of the entitled group  suggests that such
payments will need to be continued well after 2010
The second major  negative impact  on pension system  finances - which  had a more direct
effect on the core  finances  and operations of the PI - was  the cut in contribution  rate  for
pensions effective  from June  2000.  The rate was cut from 21.5 to 19.5  petcent at the same
49  Such legal challenges  are also a feature of other countries  in the region,  e.g.  Constitutional  Court
decisions  in  the  Federal  Republic  of Yugoslavia  relating  to  adjustment  of pensions  during  the
Abramovic  Government  program.  In Poland  and Macedonia  the  Constitutional  Courts have  also
intervened in the practice of providing PAYG pensions.
50  Law on Transfer of Funds  from the  Budget  to the pension  funds,  Official  Gazette,  1997  or
1998?.
St  In 1997 and 1998, by legislation,  the indexing of benefits was done using price level changes only.
Valorization,  on the other hand, resumed at the margin using changes  in wage levels in accordance
with the prior law (effective before January 1, 1999).
52  Law  on increase  of pensions  in  order  to  eliminate  differences  in  benefits  acquired  in different
periods,  Official Gazette,  127/ 2000.
34time as  a similar  two percentage  point cut in health contributions  (from  19 to  17 percent).53
This  continued  a  trend  throughout  the  1990s  of  periodic  adjustments  in  pension
contribution  rates.5 4 Although  there  was  widespread  acknowledgement  of  the  need  to
reduce  taxes  on labor in an environment  of high  and rising unemployment  (with  registered
unemnployment rising from 14.5 percent  in 1995 to 22.8 percent by end 2001), there does not
appear  to  have  been  any  modeling  done  of  the  likely  impact  on  PI  revenues.  The
understanding  was  that  central  budget  financing  would  be  made  available  to  cover  the
shori fall resulting from the cut.
The  mnpact on PI contributions revenue was immediate.  In nominal terms, PI contribution
revenue  fell between  May and June  2000 by around 5  percent,  and did not match nominal
May  2000 levels again until June 2001.  Given the positive seasonal impact on revenues from
tourism, the  seasonally-adjusted  fall in revenues was even higher.  By year's end, the central
budget  had  transferred  760 mln HRK to  the PI as compensation  for the revenue  shortfall,
which was broadly in line with the revenue  fall.  However,  in addition,  the PI was forced to
borrow  from  commercial  banks  at  market  rates  to  finance  the  increased  gap  between
revenues  and  expenditures.  This  practice  continued,  with  short  term  loans  rolled  over
during rauch of 2000 and 2001.
4. Funded Pension Pillars
4.1. FurLded pillars - accumulation stage
Starting from January 2002,  second pillar participation  is  mandatory  for insured individuals
below 40 years of age.  In addition, insured between  40 and 50 years of age have a choice to
join  the second pillar or permanently  stay only in the  first pillar. The  decision  of the 40-50
year cohort can be made by June 2002 and is irrevocable.  For those who decide  to join the
second  pillar,  contributions  will commence  with  the  next  monthly wage.  All the  insured
who enter  or join  the  second pillar will  continue to pay  a mandatory  contribution  rate  of
19.5  percent  of  gross  wage,  identical  to  those  insured  only  in  the  first  pillar.  The
contnbution  for  participants  in both pillars is split between first pillar (14.5 percent) and the
second pillar  (5 percent).  For service in the new system,  first pillar contribution will yield a
basic pension, and the lifetime annuity from the second pillar accumulation.55
Expected  affilation/coverage
In January 2002, the flow of contributions  to individual  accounts in the second pillar began.
By  April  2002,  approximately  56  percent  of  all  insured  persons  were  registered  for  the
second pillar, including 720,000  mandatory  participants  below 40 years of age, and  80,000
53  Employer's  contribution  was  lowered for the full  amount of reduction  in contribution,  i.e. from
10.750,'o  to 8.75%, while the employee's  contribution remained at 10.75%.
54  Contrbution  rates for pensions  from mid-1991  to 1994 were 22 percent of payroll.  In 1994,  this
increased to 27 percent, before  falling to 25.5 percent in 1995-1997.  From 1998-June  2000, the rate
was 21.5  percent.
55  As  explained earlier,  a basic pension  is a reduced  first pillar benefit  for those with second pillar
accounts.
35between  40 and  50 years  who decided  to join.  Registration  was  facilitated  by an effective
public  information  campaign  by  Government,  complemented  by  intensive  marketing  by
private  fund managers  (see Box 4.1.  and discussion  below on public information  campaign
and  marketing  costs).  Based  on  these  figures,  it  is  estimated  that  by  the  end  of the
application period, June 2002, around 23 percent  of insured between age  40 and 50 would
have  decided  to  jomn  the  second  pillar,  or  a  total  of around  100,000  optionally  insured
persons  in the mandatory  system.56 In the long run, second  pillar  coverage is  expected  to
reach  100 percent by the year 2025, as shown in the following figure.
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56  Participation  of 23 percent of the  40-50 cohort is  significantly below initial expectations  that 50
percent of individuals  would join,  particularly  when  compared  to the  Hungarian  experience  of 80
percent  participation  rate.  Such  a low participation  resulted mainly  from a broad public  campaign
and dissemination  of computer programs indicating that most individuals would not be better off in
the new system if the  contribution rate for the second pillar remained at 5 percent.  More  details on
calculations  and  the  assumptions  of the  programs  are  presented  on  www.rnirovinskareforma.hr,
www.mirovinskareforma.com,  www.REGOS.hr, and www.hagena.hr.
36BOX 4.1.  PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PENSION REFORM SUPPORT
An intensive  and broad  public education  and information  campaign  was an important element  of the pension
reform in Croatia.  Due to the high sensitivity of pension issues and general  distrust of broad public towards  the
pension system itself, initial PR efforts during the legislation building process in 1998 was aimed at educating on
basic  concepts  of a  three-pilar  system,  explaining  the necessity  to revise  the  parameters  and  downscale  the
PAYGO  pilar, and presenting expectations  of introduction  of the mandatory second pillar  During the initial
period,  for  example,  the  polls  indicated  that more  than  70 percent  supported  the  pension  reform,  while  the
approximately  the same percentage  had  no knowledge of the reform concept  Furthermnore,  both poll results
were evenly distributed across  generations  and regions  indicating  that most of support actually  emerged  from a
widespread dissatisfaction with the existing pension systemn.
After the public  support  for the reform  slightly deteriorated  after the Constitutional Court ruling in  1998 and
secotnd pillar postponements  in  the 1999-2001  period, the second  stage of the PR campaign  intensified with
creation  of a  regulatory  institutions  and  the emergence  of  the pension  fund  management  industry.  Public
knowledge on public reform  rapidly improved from  32 percent in mid-2001  to 55 percent at  the beginning of
the  registration  period,  and  further  to  86 percent  at the  beginning  of 2002.  In  the  first period,  the  public
campaign was oriented  towards  education  about the second pillar and promotion of a finded pension system.
From  November  2001,  the  focus  was  on  information  about  individual  account  registration  process  for
mandatory participants  and particularly population between  40 and 50 years of age who  could had an option of
joining the second pillar.  In order to provide them a tool to make a qualified choice,  Hagena made available and
publicized a computer program  for calculating expected pension levels in the new system versus the levels in the
old system  (~w-  whag=na.hr).  In the period between  November 2001 and June 2002 there were almost  90,000
visits to the web site, most of which in order to use the pension calculator.  Finally,  the pension  fuznd managers
made a significant contribution  to public education  on pension reform besides the widespread marketing activity
for acquiring membership.
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37Disabiiy)  and survivors in the secondpillar
Disability and survivors pensions are not provided in the second pillar.  In case of activation
of a disability or a survivors pension, an individual or his successors  are entitled to draw the
higher of two benefits:  the regular  first pillar or a combined  basic  pension and annuity.  If
the regular PAYG disability  and survivors  benefit exceeds  the combined pillars benefit,  the
total accumulation in the second pillar is transferred to the Pension Institute in exchange for
a  pension  that would be received  by an individual  that participated  only in  the  first pillar.
However,  if the regular  two-pillar benefit, i.e.  a sum  of basic pension and a lifetime  annuity
would exceed the standard  disabilhty or survivors  pension  from the first pillar,  an individual
or his  successors  would  receive  a  combined  benefit.  Since  the  annuity  is  determined  by
dividing  the total accumulation  by the life expectancy of a beneficiary,  it is not expected that
a combined benefit would be paid often during the next 15 years.
Pension  find  management, administration  and capital  requirements
According  to  Croatian pension  legislation, private  pension  funds  are  not legal entities  but
property with a special  status owned by the participants,  a status  similar to a bank deposit.
Every  pension  fund  must  be  managed  by  a  pension  fund  management  company.  A
mandatory pension  fund is established by a mandatory pension fund management company,
while  a voluntary  pension  fund  can  be  established  by  a voluntary  pension  fund company,
pension  insurance  company  or  a  sponsor."  A  pension  fund  manager  is  authorized  and
granted the license for establishing a pension fund by HAGENA after a two-stage procedure
of analyzing  and assessing  the company's  suitability to manage  a mandatory  pension  fund.
Each  mandatory  fund manager  can be  authorized  to manage  only one  mandatory  pension
fund,  while  the  voluntary  pension  fund  manager  is  entitled  to  manage  more  funds.
Supervision  of fund management companies  will be done by the Agency for Supervision  of
Pension Funds and Insurance,  HAGENA.58
The minimum  share  capital that a mandatory  pension fund manager must pay in cash is 40
million Kuna  (around  USD  5  million), while the minimum number of members should be
80,000 by the third year of fund operations.  In case of a voluntary pension fund, minimum
capital required is 15 million Kuna (around USD  1.8 million),  while the minimum number of
affiliates should be 2,000 by the third year of operations.
REGOS - the Central  Registy ofAffiliates
REGOS  was  established  in  1999  with  the  primary  task  to collect,  enforce,  register  and
transfer  mandatory  second  pillar contributions  and  for registration  of affiliation,  switching
and account  management.  It is  a  key feature  of the  Croatian  reform,  acting  as  a central
clearinghouse.  To  perform  this function,  REGOS  had to  establish  a  central  database  of
second  pillar  affiliates,  and  develop  and  adtninister  a new  monthly  personified  reporting
form that  provides the personal data needed for the second pillar.
57  A pension fund sponsor can be a trade union, employer, occupational  or other organization.
58  HAGENA  was establshed  as a separate regulator  for pension funds and pension insurance after
consideration  of a unified contractual  savings regulator. Discussion  on separate pension regulator can
be found in Demarco and Rofman  (1998) and Vittas  (1998).
38The  lack of monthly individualized  reporting has been recognized as an important source of
non-compliance  in  paying  payroll  taxes.  Second  pillar  introduction  was  used  as  an
opportunity to expand monthly reporting to all contributions, personal income  tax and local
incoine  surtaxes.  While  the  inefficiency  of  fragmented  employer  reporting  had  been
acknowledged for some time, second pillar introduction  was an ideal vehide for overcoming
the resistance of EBFs in particular  (see Box 4.2. below). The monthly report, known as the
RS  form,  was  introduced  in  January  2002  to  collect  monthly  documentation  from
employers.59 Parallel  with  data  collection,  employers  have  to  submit  the  payments  for  all
payroll  taxes associated with the  RS  form to FINA, the public  financial  agency which was
formerly  the  central  payments  agency.  REGOS  and  FINA  reconcile  the  payments  with
money transfers,  and transfer the collections to responsible  agencies.'
The most important motives  for establishment of REGOS were cost control and privacy of
individual  choice.  In  principle,  centralization  of  registration,  collection  and  account
managerment  and  its  provision  to mandatory  second  pillar  funds  was  expected  to  keep
administratLve  costs  at low  levels  and  enable  transparent  market competition  (though  see
discussion  below  for initial  outcomes).6'  Individuals  choose  the  desired  fund at  remote
offices, without intermediation of pension fund agents or knowledge of the employees of the
chosen  fund.  When  employers  transfer  second  pillar  funds  for  their  employees,  the
aggregate  amount is divided by REGOS in accordance  with amounts  stated in the RS form,
and  transferred to the private  pension  fund of an individual in line with the affiliation  data
registered  at a central  database.  Similarly, when  an individual  desires  to change  funds, she
does  so  by  an individual  request  to REGOS  without  revealing  the  decision  to either  the
employer, the fund she is leaving or the new fund she is joining, thus ensuring privacy.
Switchingprocedures
If a member  is  for any reason  unsatisfied  with  the pension  company  managing  the  fund
where the member has her account opened,  she will be allowed to withdraw  all of her funds
and to transfer them to another  mandatory  fund at any time.  Every insured person will be
allowed  to join another mandatory fund free of charge  after her five years of membership of
a  particular  fund  have  expired,  whereas  a  fee  of  5  percent  of  total  accumulation  is
determined  for switching in the first year of affiliation  to a specific  fund; 2.5 percent  in the
second;  1.25 percent  in third; 0.625 percent  in fourth; and 0.31 percent in the fifth year and
activities  related to transfer of members will be supervised by REGOS. Such a switching  fee
has been  established  in order to discourage  excessive  switching in the first years of second
pillar operations,  and consequently  avoid the related acquisition costs.  In 2002, second pillar
particpants were eligible for one free switch.'  Besides keeping track of individual accounts
of fund members, REGOS also keeps records  on member transfers  so as to minimize abuse.
59  Details on monthly RS report can be retrieved from www.regos.hr.
60  Personal income tax, health, PAYG  pension and unemployment  contributions  are transferred  to
the  central  budget  - Treasury,  local  surtaxes  to  local  banks,  and  second  pillar  contributions  to
REGOS  which transfers the funds to custodian banks according to the affiliate database.
61  See Demarco and Rofman (1999) for a discussion of collection  alternatives.
62  Despite low frequency of switching in 2002 (see Section 4.3. for details),  switching fees have been
identified  as prohibitively high.  Hagena  has announced reduction of switching  fees during 2003  to
0,8% of total individual accumulation in first, 0,4% in second and 0,2% in third year.
39Box 4.2. The broader impact of second pillar reform on payroll and tax reporting and
enforcement
An important  feature of the Croatian pension reform has been its catalytic effect on the broader reform of
the public revenue  system  with  respect to mandatory  social  contributions  and personal  income  taxes.
The  development  of the  RS  form  and  associated  reporting  system  has  been  the end  product of wider
efforts  since  2000  to  consolidate  several  aspects  of the revenue  system  for contributions  and personal
income  taxes, including reportng, enforcement and control.
In  terms  of reporting  on contributions,  the  inherited  system  imposed  a  heavy  reporting  burden  on
employers,  who have  been  required  to submit  information  on contributions  and  taxes  due to different
institutions,  all  of which  demand  their  own  format  for  reporting.  In  total,  the  system  prior  to  2002
required  the employer to report and submit some 20 different forms  on either a monthly  or annual basis.
Apart  from  the  excessive  demands  on  employers,  the  system  was  inefficient  in  terms  of  public
administration,  with parallel networks  of staff for data and contribution  collection  and processing  in the
Health  Insurance  Institute,  Pension  Institute  and  Tax  Department  interacting  with  the  same  set  of
employers.  For example,  in  the PI alone, the  estimated  number  of staff dedicated  to  these functions  at
end  2001  was  around  1,000  out of a  total  staff of 3,300.  Enforcement  was  also  done until 2000 on a
fragmented  basis,  imposing  additional inspection  and  other  demands  on  employers.  Final  control  on
contributions  was also done separately by each institution  to whom payments were made.
From  2000, the  Government  began  taking steps  to  lessen  the  burden  on  employers,  and improve  the
efficiency  and transparency of the  system.  The Government  is implementing the new strategy in stages.
Apart  from  the  introduction  of the RS  form  for unified  reporting,  the  main  measures  to  consolidate
enforcement and control have been the following
*  in July 2000,  the Tax Department - through  the single Treasury account - assumed enforcement  of
pension contributions for all contributors  except the self-employed;
*  in July 2001,  the Tax Department also assumed responsibility  for contribution  collection  for the PI,
and from January 2002 also for the HII ';
*  Effective in 2002,  the Tax Department is responsible  for all auditing of enterprises, with support by
the PI for control functions  on employer reporting on employee status; and
*  Effective  in  mid-2002,  the  Tax  Department  will  assume  responsibility  for  unified  control  and
enforcement  of all payroll taxes.  Inspectors  currently  working in HII and the PI have  already or will
join  the Tax Department.  The  actual withholding  of contributions  from employers  continues  to  be
done by the Financial Agency (FINA), the successor agency of the central payments  system.
These reforms  should go a considerable  way  towards a more efficient  system  of enforcement  and control
of contributions  which will complement  the RS form  introduction.  While  there remain  concerns in the
extra-budgetary  funds about the  capacity and incentives  for  the Tax Department  to do effective  control
on contributions,  these  should be reduced in  practice  by the assumption  of staff and expertise  into the
Tax Department.
While the new system of  reporting, enforcement  and control is still being fully put in place, data from the
first  quarter  of 2002  suggest  that  the  new system  as  a  whole  is  beginning  to induce  improvements  in
collections  even at an early stage.  The year-on-year increase in total pension contribution  collection in the
first  quarter of 2002 was  5.8  percent;  for health  contributions,  collection  improved  by  7.5  percent,  and
unemployment contributions improved  by 9 percent, which is significantly  higher than a modest increase
in the corresponding  contribution base - nominal gross wage bill of 2.4 percent ,  or the  1.16 percent  rise
in  total  tax  revenue.  If  the  positive  trend in  compliance  persists,  the  fiscal  pressure  of financing  the
transition cost would diminish rapidly,  which would make  room for faster pillar substitution  through a
higher second Pillar contribution rate and/or further reductions in the pension contribution  rate.
40Guarantees  in the secondpillar
The  return  on  second  pillar  individual  accounts  in  Croatia  is  subject  to  a  relative  rate
guarmntee,  shown on Figure 4.2. below.  The guaranteed rate of return is specified in relation
to the reference  rate of guarantee, which under  supplementary  acts of HAGENA,  is set as
the  market-share-weighted  average  of actual  rate  of  return  lowered  by  two  percentage
points:"
Refeience  rate of Return  =  actual market-share-weighted  rate of return minus 2 percentage  points,
(2)
where rnarket  shares are based on assets.'  The reference rate of return  is calculated  once a
year for the period of a calendar year.  The rule of deducting two percentage points from the
actual rate  of return  was  introduced  in  order  to elininate  asymmetry  in  the range  around
zero, and  thus  to reduce  the  likelihood  of guarantee  activation.  With  a guaranteed  rate  of
return dlefined  as:
Guaranteed rate of return = Reference rate of Return /  3, if greater than zero;  (3)
=  Reference rate of Return * 3, if lower than zero;
- subject to maximum discount rate of the NBC.
a deduction  of  two  percentage  points in the reference  rate led to an effective  reduction  in
the  level  of  the  already-low  relative  rate  guarantee  in  the  second  pillar  in  Croatia.
Comparison  with  countries  with  relative  rate  guarantees  in  Table  4.1.  indicates  that the
Croatian  formula provides  a lower guarantee level than found in most other systems65:
63  There  was  an extensive  debate  among policymakers  and  fund managers  in Croatia  on how the
reference  rate of return  should be  detemiined. Altematives  induded market-share-weighted  average
of  funds'  RoRs;  market-share-and-asset-class-weighted  average  RoR  of pension  funds;  or  some
reference  RoR  exogenously  determined  by  HAGENA.  Assessing  that  an  exogenous  RoR would
carry a high risk of guarantee  activation,  and that double-weighted RoR would be too complicated,
HAGENA  opted  for  a  market-share-weighted  average  RoR  of pension  funds  lowered  by  two
percentage points.
64  Individual fund's weight is capped at 25%.
65  See  WB  Pension  Reform  Primer,  for  which  materials  are  available  at
www.  -1dbank.org/pensions.
41Table 4.1.  Relative Rate of Return Guarantee, various countries
Country  Guarantee
Argentina  smaller  of:  70%  of funds'  average  nominal  return,  and  average  nomninal
return minus 2%.
Chile  smaller  of:  50%  of funds'  average real return, and funds' average  real return
_munus 2%.
Colombia  minimum  based  on  both  average  of funds'  performrance,  and  return  on
benchmark portfolio.
Hungary  15%  less than the yield on a government bond index;
Peru  smaller  of:  50%  of funds' average  real return,  and funds'  average real return
minus 2%.
Poland  smaller  of:  50%  of funds'  average  nominal  return,  and  average  nominal
return minus 4%.
Uruguay  smaller of:  2% real, and funds' average norninal return minus  2%.
Source:  Guarantees.  Counting the Cost of Guaranteeing  DC Pensions. World Bank Pension Primer
Notes  (2000).
The  use  of lower-than-usual  guarantee  was  a  deliberate  policy  choice  during the  funded
system design in 1998.  It was argued that high rate-of-return guarantee,  particularly if set in
absolute terms, might have several adverse effects, depending on the source of its finance.  If
the guarantee was to be high and financed by fund members, it would lead to lower effective
rates of return for all members  and to aggressive investment strategies by fund managers.  If
financed by the fund managers,  it could lead to a "bandwagon  effect" in investment among
pension  fund  managers.  Alternatively,  financing  the  guarantee  from  the  central  budget
might lead  to imprudent  investment  policy  and  create  a large  contingent  liability  for  the
central  budget.  In  order  to  minimize  potential  reduction  of the  rate  of return  for  fund
members  and distortions in the pension fund market, pohicymakers  opted for a mild relative
rate  of return  guarantee  which  would  protect members  of the pension  fund  whose  fund
manager performed significantly worse than the others, i.e. only in extreme cases.  To further
minimize the probability  that the guarantee would be triggered, policymakers decided to split
the  costs  of a  guarantee  among  the  fund  managers  and  the  central  budget.'  The  most
interesting  feature  of the guarantee  formula in Croatia  is  that it is  syrnmetrically  defined in
the  negative  rate-of-return  ranges,  as  well  as  in  the  positive.  Consequently,  the  entire
investment risk is placed on the individual with  the argument that payment of the absolute
guarantee  would  again introduce  principles  of the solidarity  system.  It was  further argued
that the change in value of the pension portfolio should resemble the change in its financing
base,  while  the  solidarity  should  be  effectuated  in  the  payout  stage.  Consequently,
policymakers  in Croatia  decided  to introduce  a  full guarantee  in  the payout (annuity)  stage
rather than in the accumulation  stage, which is explained further in the text.
With the current portfolio limit of minimum 50 percent of assets to be invested in long term
government debt instruments,  the likelihood of guarantee  activation  has been reduced  to a
minimum.  Guarantees  could be  triggered  only by  extreme  plunge  in prices  in the  capital
66  Passing  a share  of the  costs onto  the  fund managers  would probably  lead to some bandwagon
effect in the pension fund management industry.
42markets.67 In case of guarantee activation,  individual accounts  have to be reimbursed up  to
the level  of the guaranteed  rate of return  from  the  following  sources  and in the  following
order:
1.  Guarantee  deposit (unlimited);
2.  Base capital of the fund management  company  (up  to 20 percent  of the stock);
and
3.  State budget (unlimited).
The  guarantee  deposit  is  a  designated  part  of the  charter  capital  of  the  pension  fund
management  company  kept  at separate  account  at the  custodian bank.  The  management
company  is  required  to deposit  one  million  Kuna  (around  USD120,000)  for  each  10,000
members in excess of a minimum affiliation level of 80,000, and to deposit 75 percent of the
success  fee  for each  successive  3 year period.  Since  the resources to finance  the guarantee
deposits  are limited and the deposit is part of the base  capital of the company, it can be said
that  the  prime  responsibility  to  cover  the  guarantee  rests  with  the  fund  management
company.  In time, with a growing  second pillar, the contingent liability on the state budget
will increase, particularly if and when the investment limits are relaxed.
Despite  a relatively low level of guarantee in Croatia, the primary  responsibility of the fund
manager to cover it might result in some portfolio concentration,  thus reducing the positive
impacts  on  capital  market  development.  This  nsk  could  reduce  needed  portfolio
diversification,  particularly  after the initial years  when portfolio  concentration  is expected in
any event.
67  Simulations indicate  that with such  a limit on investnent in government  bonds, guarantee would
be activated  only  for  a fund  with maximum  exposure  to equities  and  a decline in  equity prices  of
40%, assuming that all other funds are not investing in equities.
43Figure 4.2  Guaranteed relative rate of return
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On the  other hand, the  low level of the relative  rate of return  guarantee  in Croatia implies
minimal  contingent  liabilities  for  the  both  fund  managers  and  the  budget,  and
correspondingly  assures  fiscal sustainability and low cost of  guarantees in the accumulation
stage of the second pillar.68
Investment limits
Following the  framework  set out by Vittas,  pension  fund investment  regulation  in Croatia
would  fit into  the  draconian  category.69 Legislation  distinguishes  between  acceptable  and
prohibited asset classes, and mtroduces  quantitative limits by asset class and issuer.  Assets of
both mandatory and voluntary pension funds can be invested In:
*  Short term bills and other short term papers issued by Republic of Croatia and NBC,
and short term bank deposits;
*  long term bonds issued by Republic of Croatia and NBC;
*  long term bonds issued by local governments;
*  long term corporate bonds;
*  Stocks listed in first quotation of the Zagreb Stock Exchange;
*  long term bonds issued by OECD countries;
*  long term corporate bonds issued in OECD countries  (rated A or above);and
68  See Lachance and Mitchel,  forthcoming.
69  Vittas  (1998).*  stocks of OECD country companies listed in highest quotations of OECD markets;
and
*  stocks and shares in domestic and foreign investment funds investing predominantly
in sovereign bonds of OECD countries.
In  c.ontrast,  pension  funds  ate  prohibited  from  investing in  securities  not  listed  and  not
traded at organized stock exchanges;  futures,  options and other derivatives;  real estate; assets
with  indeterminable  value  (arts,  antiquities,  vehicles);  and  securities  issued  by  persons
affiliated  to  fund  management  company  and  the  custodian  bank.  Investment  limits  are
determined by asset classes in the following manner:
Type  Limit  Percentage
Foreign investment total  max  15
ShLort  term  T  and  NBC  max  5
bills and cash
State and NBC bonds  mm  50
Local  government  and  max  30
municipal bonds
Local corporate bonds  max  30
Domestic  equity  and  max  30
invrestment  funds
Additional investment limits that apply to international investment are:
[Type  Limit  Percentage
Foreign state bonds  max  15
Foreign corporate  max  10
stocks and bonds
Shares In investment  Max  5
finds  _
InvestMrent  limits  aimed to ensure adequate diversification  per issuer allow for  a maximum
of 5 percent  of a pension fund's  assets  to be invested  in one issuer,  including the issuer's
affiliated companies.  This limit does not apply to investmnent in state bonds.
Although  the  investment  limits  for  Croatian  pension  funds  are  quite  tight,  they  are
comparable  with limits in other transition  countries which are launching three-pillar pension
reforms  An exception is a requirement that at least 50 percent  of assets have to be invested
in long  term  government  bonds.  There  is  a  concern  that  such  limits  could  lead  to less
diversification  and  more  uniform  portfolio  structures.70 On the  other  hand,  they should
promote lower risk portfolios, reduce  the probability of triggering the guarantee,  and among
other effects, provide an additional source of financing the transition.
70  Setting a minimum required asset share of 50% to be invested in government  bonds was driven by
unfavorable  general  government  fiscal  balance  and  declining  economic  activity  in  1999  and  early
2000.  This  lirnit  is  expected  to be  reconsidered  in  the  first years  of second  pillar  operations  and
ultimately lifted.
45Current investment regulations  are identical  for mandatory  and voluntary pension funds.  In
most three-pillar systems the investment limits for voluntary pension funds are more relaxed
than for the mandatory pension  funds.7'  Since the timetable  for establishment of the funded
pillars was  tight at the time when  the legislation was  drafted, it seemed pragmatic  to apply
the same rules  for both pillars.  In addition, using identical  limits was expected to be easier
from  the  supervision  standpoint.  Nonetheless,  HAGENA  is  expected  to  relax  the
investment  limits for voluntary  funds in  amendments  to the Funds  Law  expected  towards
the end of 2002.
Second Pillar  Costs -Pension  Fund  Management Fees and OtherAdministrative Costs
Pension fund management companies  can earn income by charging four different fees:
*  maximum 0.8 percent front-end fee on paid-in contributions;
*  maximum 0.8 percent of net asset value  (NAV) per annum; 7
*  switching fee/exit fee; and
*  success  fee of 25 percent  of real annual  return  (25  percent  of which  collected  as
current revenue  and 75 percent  of which is paid into the guarantee  deposit for each
successive three year period and collected after this period).73
The  front  loaded  fee  of max  0.8  percent  is  deducted  automatically  with  every  monthly
contribution  by  REGOS  and  paid  to  fund  management  companies,  while  the  net
contribution is transferred  to the individual account at the respective custodian bank.
The  NAV  fee  is  calculated  daily  and  collected  once  a  month.74 The law  stipulates  that
HAGENA  will revisit  the NAV  fee  cap  in  coming years  and reduce  it accordingly.  The
costs deducted to obtain the net asset value include only the custody fee, while the brokerage
fees are to be covered by the fund management company.75
7'  Vittas,  1998.
72  Applies to 2002; maximum NAV fee for subsequent years could be set below 0,8% by HAGENA.
73  The main rationale  for introducing the success  fee was to give  an opportunity to more successful
and efficient  funds  to eam a relatively  larger  fee, be  relatively better  rewarded  for higher efficiency
and thus more capable  for market  competition  with the large funds.  The rationale  for introduction
of a three-year claw-back period was primarily to  finance the guarantee  deposit in case one needs to
be activated  and secondly  to smooth the income stream for the fund management companies;  in  the
high-return  periods  the  companies  would  not realize  all  the  success  fee,  while  in  the low-return
periods  fund management  companies  would  still be realizing  some success  fees with  a lag  of three
years.
74  Valuation  of the pension  fund assets  is  carried  on  a  daily  basis  by respective  custodian  banks,
which would imply that the NAV  fee  could be calculated  accordingly.  However, the supplementary
acts of HAGENA do not specify the details of daily NAV fee calculation  and monthly fee collection.
The same technical obstade is found with regulated daily calculation of custodian  fee calculation and
its monthly collection.
75  It is common that  the brokerage  and trading  fees get paid  from the pension  fund, not the fund
management  company.  It is argued that imposing the liability  for paying brokerage  and trading fees
onto fund management companies  in Croatia  could induce a "buy-and-hold"  investment  strategy in
order to minimize cost, thus lowering liquidity in the market However, it is  also a fact that the main
46The success  fee is  to be  calculated  on  the first business  day of the  calendar  year for the
previous  year as  25  percent  of real rate of change of NAV, computed  using  the previous
year's  C-PI.  The  total amount is registered  as a liability of the  fund. 76 Upon calculation  and
subtraction of the success  fee, a pension fund management  company is eligible to register as
income 25 percent of the success fee, and deposit remaining  75 percent for a period of three
year:;.77 Such  a calculation  method  could lead  to an  "asset-value-boosting"  strategy  at the
end of calendar year.  To reduce that behavior, it was argued that the success  fee should be
calculated and collected quarterly with a  final annual reconciliatton.
Intemnational  experience  with  fees  charged  by  fund  management  companies  for account
admmnistration  and asset management  shows that in most countries with mandatory  second
pilars,  fund management  companies  are  not  entitled  to  such  a wide  spectrum  of fees.78
Havmg  mn mind  that  collection,  account  administration  and  reporting  will  be  the
responsibility of REGOS, this raises  a question whether in Croatia the variety  of fees  could
induce  high  operating  costs  in the  second  pillar.  If fund  managers  maintain  fees  at the
capped  levels, the average annual reduction  in annual yield would be as high as  1.4 percent
in  the  next  40  years,  as  shown  on  Figure  4.3.  When  expressed  in  term  of  annual
contribution,  total  fees  are more  than  15  percent  in 2015  and reach  almost 20  percent in
2033.79  A reduction in yield (rate of return) in Croatia of 1.4 percent would be accompanied
by a reduction  in premium/charge  ratio of close to 25  percent if fees would be imposed at
their cap values.'
shareholders  of fund management companies in Croatia are commercial  and investment banks which
could generate  substantial  fees  for their brokerage  and trading  branches  by engaging in  extensive
trading. Furthermore,  trading costs in Croatia are still relatively high, while the main shareholders  of
fund management  companies  are at the same time the main shareholders of the two stock exchanges
(Zagreb and Varazdin Stock Exchanges).
76  Final  adjustment of the success  fee is  expected by the end of  January of the following year, when
the  final  CPI  for  the  previous  year  would  be  known.  Similar  to  the  NAV  fee,  the  calculation
procedure  is not precise regarding the stage when costs would have to be subtracted and the CPI rate
applied.
77  Upon  expiration  of a  three-year  claw-back  period a  fund management  company is  eligible  to
register as income the full remaining amount of 75% of the success fee.
78  See Whitehouse,  2000; James, Smalhout,  and Vittas,  2000; World Bank Pension Reform  Primer
Notes, 2000.
79  In absolute terms the fee per account is expected to reach $4.5 in 2002, $10.5 in 2004, $20 in 2006,
$84  in 2015 and almost $225 in 2033.
80  It is assumed that real net rate of return would stand at 2.5 percent  per annum.  In the long run,
the NAV fee and the success  fee would contribute to manager's income in equal proportions.
47Figure 4.3  Projected commissions/fees  as share of assets in second pillar
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In  comparison  with  other mandatory  funded  systems  such  a  cost can  be  considered  very
high.8'  If the operating costs of REGOS devoted to second pillar contribution collection  and
individual  account management  are  added,  the administrative  costs  in 2002 would  increase
by additional 1.5 percent of second pillar accumulation,  or close to $4 per account in 2002, if
no  cost  recovery  from  pension  funds  is  envisaged.82  Assumning  low  cost  recovery  for
REGOS  operations,  the long run second  pillar costs  could reach two percentage points  of
annual yield.  In the  initial period  of second pillar operation,  the  operating  costs would be
even higher - approaching  2.5  percentage  ponts of annual yield in the  first several  years  -
due to  the relatively  large  startup  costs  of REGOS in  comparison  with  the second  pillar
size. 8'  Since such high costs could jeopardize  the expected higher returns of the second pillar
81  See World Bank Pension Reform Primer Notes, 2000.
82  Total operating costs  and investment of REGOS is 2002 are budgeted  at kuna 30 million, which
includes  services  to second  pillar  and other  data user in the public  finance  system,  exhausting  1.5
percent  of second  pillar inflow  in 2002.  In the  following years  the  REGOS  budget is expected  to
decline in terms of annual  second pillar inflow  to 1 percentage  point. Initial investment and startup
costs of REGOS are to be partly financed by a  loan from the World Bank, while in the long run the
bulk of REGOS  costs are  expected to be recovered  from pension fund management companies  for
the  service  provided  within  the  current  management  fee  envelope.  In  that  case  the  impact  of
REGOS costs on reduction in net contribution or yield would be smaller.
83  Since  REGOS  simultaneously  performs  services  for Tax Department,  Pension  Institute,  Health
Institute and Employment Bureau,  it is difficult to extract costs exclusive  to the second pillar.  If we
assume that REGOS uses 75 percent of its capacity for servicmg the second pillar, adding  this share
of its  budget to  the management  fees would  yield  a total cost level of 2.5  percent of second pillar
accumulation  in the first three years, but would fall afterwards.
48in  comparison  to  the  PAYG  system,  steps  for  cost  control,  cost  recovery  and  reduction
should be considered immediately.
Figure  4.3  also  shows  that  the relative  importance  of the  front-loaded  fee  is  expected  to
decline rapidly, while the relative importance of the success  fee should reach the level of the
NAN  fee.  Furthermore,  while  the front-loaded  fee  and NAV fee  are  specified in terms  of
maximum  percentage  levels,  in  order  to  allow  for  price  competition,  the  success  fee  is
determined  in  fixed  percentage  terms,  without  an  opportunity  for the  fund management
company to set it at a lower level.  The driving idea in fixing the success  fee in the legislation
was the role  it plays in financing  the safety  mechamsm  of the  guarantee  deposits.S4  It was
believed  that fund management companies  should not be given the opportunity to compete
over the  success fee, and thus minimize  the build-up of the company's guarantee deposit.
Figure 4.4  Projected estimates  for fees/assets  in funded scheme,
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However,  a rolling claw-back of 75 percent of the success  fee does not appear to be a very
effective  tool to protect against  shortfalls in the rate of return.  After  a strong  increase  in
guarantee  deposits  during  the initial claw-back  period,  the available  guarantee  deposits  will
peak  at  1.5  percent  of  second  pillar  contributions  due  to  withdrawals.  Such  a  level  of
84  As indicated earlier, 75 percent of the success  fee has to be deposited in the guarantee  deposit for
each  successive  3  year  period,  after which  a fund management  company  can  claim  it back  as  its
revenue.
49guarantee  deposit would be  sufficient  to absorb  minor rate-of-return  shocks,  but certainly
does not provide adequate cushion against larger shocks, which would ultimately have to be
covered by the base capital of fund management companies and the state budget.
Initial market  behavior m 2002  also provides  indications  that both the  fee  levels  and  their
structure might not be optimal.  Fund management  companies with the largest market  share
announced  gradual reductions  in their NAV  fees to 0.4 percent and in front loaded  fees to
0.5 percent  over several years.  At the same time,  competition  over the success  fee did not
take place due to the rigidities in the law noted above.  Consequently,  once the front loaded
and  NAV  fees  are  reduced  to  these levels,  the  fee  structure  and  relative  to  second  pillar
contributions  would  change  to  a  pattern  shown  on  Figure  4.4,  representing  a  total  fee
burden around 27 percent lower than would be produce if firms charged at the fee cap rates:
Figure 4.5  Total fees  relative to gross contribution flows
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n-  With announced fee reduction
Assuming that the reduction of NAV  fee to 0.4 percent is implemented  by fund managers,
the relative  contribution to income of the success  fee could in several years outstrip that of
NAV fee.  With such a  fee structure, the pension fund management  business in Croatia may
engage in excessive risk taking in order to maximize  the rate of return in the short run.  An
interesting  question  is  why  the  pension  fund  management  companies  decided  to  price-
compete  in  the  earliest  stage  of  second  pillar  existence.  Besides  a  simple  battle  for
membership,  which  has undoubtedly  taken  place,  it seems  that  the  companies  announced
reduction  in  fees  after realizing  that caps  had  been  set at very  high  levels.  Nevertheless,
Figure 4.5 indicates  that even with the announced  fee reductions, management  costs would
50in the long run reduce the second pillar rate of return by around 1 percentage point without
the fund administration  services provided by REGOS.
Figure 4.6  Impact of fee reduction on ratio of fees/GDP,  2002-2040
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Hence, total costs would remain in the upper range of international practice.83 On the  other
hand, the  announced reduction in  fees would  mean lower  costs and higher  accumulation  in
the individual accounts.
If additional front-loaded  and NAV  fee reductions  occurs,  the share of success  fees in  total
cost structure would increase  further.  Having fund managers rely primarily on success  fees
could create  a serious  barrier to entry for potential pension fund managers.  A new entrant
to the market would face very high startup costs and an extended break-even point due to a
revenue structure heavily based on success fees.
It is  clear  that policymakers  in Croatia  will have  to  address  the issue  of the  current  sub-
optimal structure of fees and their levels in the near future.  Allowing  for price  competition
over the success  fee would add options to both existing  fund management  companies  and
new  entrants  to structure  fees  according  to their market  strategy.86 HAGENA  has been
considering  elimination of the success fee in order to reduce  complexity of the fee structure
85  According to Murthi et aL,  reduction in yield due  to administrative  charges  stands at 1.39 percent
in Mexco,  1.2-1.3 percent  in the UK; 1.2 percent  in Argentina; 0.85 percent  in Poland; 0.88 percent
in Chile; 0.85 percent  in El Salvador; 0.55 percent  in Kazakhstan; and 0.46 percent  in Bolivia.
86  The Funds Law could instead of current provisions deternine the success  fee as the maximum of
25  percent  of real  annual  return,  and/or  reduce  the  cap  to  10  percent,  i.e.  a  level  similar  to
Kazakh stan.
51and eliminate potential barriers to entry.57 Parallel to elimination  of the success  fee, a higher
cap on NAV fee is proposed  to be set at 1.2 percent instead of 0.8 percent.  Possible impact
of proposed fee restructuring,  shown on the following figure, would in the first 8 years lead
to even higher charges.
Figure 4.7  Management fees  for funded scheme,  current versus proposed, 2002-2040
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In the long run the charges would be lower, yet still in the high range of 15 percent of annual
contribution to the second pillar as shown in Figure 4.7.
It would also be needed to assess whether  such a radical  change at the initial stage of second
pillar  implementation  would  seriously  affect  business  plans  and  the  already-conducted
marketing and development  strategies of fund management companies.
Finally,  serious  consideration  should be given  to realization  of pension funds'  participation
in the costs of account  management and fund administration incurred  by REGOS  in order
to promote  full transparency  in the cost structure.  This option is allowed under the Funds
Law, and has precedents  in countries such as Mexico.
87  The  proposed  change  in  fee  structure  has  been  forwarded  as  a  draft  to  the  Parliament,  and
expected to be discussed there in early 2003.
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Voluntaypensionfunds  and voluntay  pension programs
Voluntary  pension  funds have  been  established  as voluntary  individual  capitalized  savings,
with  the  purpose  of  collecting  and  investing  contributions  paid  by  any  adult  citizen  in
Croatia.  Insured persons or their employers are able to contribute to individual accounts in
a  volunmary  pension  fund  regularly  or  occasionally.  Each voluntary  pension  fund will  be
obliged  to  offer  a  pension  insurance  program  which  members  would  accept  by  their
membership.  In addition,  each pension insurance  company  will have to inform members in
advance  of the possibility of leaving the underlying program and the cost of exit.
In any case, the assets  accumulated in individual accounts in a voluntary pension fund must
be managed  by a voluntary pension company, licensed by HAGENA.  Just as for mandatory
pension fund management companies,  a voluntary management  company will be supervised
by  HAGENA,  will  be  remunerated  for  management,  and  will  have  the  opportunity  to
participote  in sharing of the fund's profit,  following the  same level and structure  of fees  as
mandatory pension companies.
Upon acquiring  the right upon retirement  or 50 years  of age,  every member of a voluntary
pension  fund will have  the  right to transfer  the  total amount  of their personal  capitalized
savings  to  the  corresponding  insurance  company  which  will,  based  on  this  amount,
determine  his/her  life  pension  annuity  and  scheduled  withdrawals,  or  withdraw  funds
through  other eligible  pension products in the voluntary  pension insurance market.88 Each
fund  member  will  also  have  an  opportunty  to  switch  to  another  fund  and  join another
pension scheme  after compensating the pension insurer whose scheme a person is leaving.
88  Lurnp- sum payrnents  are allowed but cannot exceed 30 percent of the total accumulated  amount
53Voluntary  pension  system will  operate  in the EET  framework.  Individual  contibutions to
voluntary  pension  fund  accounts  can  be  deducted  from  personal  income  tax base  up  to
12,000 kuna ($1,700)  annually.  In addition  to contribution  exemption,  the  state tops-up the
contribution to an individual account with 25% up to annual conttibution  cap of 5,000  kuna
per  individual.89 Pension  benefits  received  from  the  voluntary  system  will  be  taxed  in
accordance with the personal income tax rules.
4.2. Funded pillars - the payout stage
The pay-out of annuitiesfrom  the secondpillar  accumumlation
When an individual member of  a mandatory  pension fund becomes  eligible  for retirement
under the  Pension Insurance Act,90 REGOS  will transfer the total amount of her  personal
capitalized  savings  to a  licensed pension insurance  company  chosen by the individual.9'  A
pension insurance company will, based on this amount and the individual selection of a type
of pension, determine  the individual's lifetime benefit  The payout stage of funded pension
insurance  is regulated by the Annuities Law).92
The mandatory  funded  system (second pillar) allows only price-indexed  life annuities.  Such
a restriction  is commonly found in most second pillars around the world.93 This  feature is
dnven by the mandatory nature of the second  pillar, which should provide  lifetime income
replacement.  In Croatia, voluntary pension  insurance can, in addition to lifetime  annuities,
offer  other  pension  products,  such  as  programmed  withdrawals,  variable  annuities,  and
annuity-withdrawal  combinations,  with  a variety  of indexation  options.  In  the voluntaty
system, lump-sum payouts are capped  at 30 percent  of the accumulated amount.
The  mandatory  funded  pillar  offers  four  types  of annuities:  single;  single  with  guarantee
period; joint-and-survivor;  and joint-and  survivor with guarantee period.  The single  annuity
is to be paid  to an individual for the rest of her life, and single with guarantee  period to an
individual  for the rest  of her life,  but, if death  occurs  within  the  guarantee  period,  to the
89  Contribution  top-up was  originally legislated in 1999 when the personal income  tax system was
exemption-free. Exemption was introduced in 2000 but the contribution  top-up was never revoked.
90  Old-age,  disability,  survivors  pension  or  an  early  retirement  Retirement  date  for  the  both
mandatory pillars are the same.
91  Each  pension  insurance  company  is  required  to  quote  annuity  units  under  supervision  and
approval  of HAGENA.  Three  months  before  retirement  an  individual  can  obtamn  all  relevant
information  from REGOS, in addition to information  provided by the pension insurance companies
directly.  Upon studying the options  and choosing  a pension insurance company,  an individual issues
a request  to  REGOS  to  transfer  the  total  accumulated  funds  from  a pension  fund to  a pension
insurance  company  chosen by  the individual.  REGOS  would  then issue a  request to  the pension
fund to transfer the funds  to its  transient account, from where it  is directed  to a pension insurance
company.  The role of REGOS in this  process is  to provide adequate  information to  an individual,
limrit direct contact with  a pension insurance  company  to a minimum in order  to eliminate  cases  of
adverse  selection  and  finally,  to  ensure  that  a fee  to a  pension insurance  company  is  calculated,
deducted  and  paid  properly.  A  pension  insurance  company  must  accept  every  second  pillar
participant.
92  Law on Pension Insurance Based on Individual Capitalized Accounts, Official Gazette, 106, 1999.
93  See Walliser,  1998;James and Vittas, 1999.
54designated  beneficiary  until the end of guarantee  period.  The joint-and-survivor  annuity is
paid jcintly to  both  spouses, and when  one  spouse  dies,  50  percent  of the amount  to the
other  for  the  rest  of her  life.  The  joint-and-survivor  annuity  with  guarantee  period  in
addition covers  the case  where both spouses  die within  the guarantee  period.  In this case,
60  percent  of the  joint  amount  is  paid  to  the  designated  beneficiary  until  the  end  of
guaiantee period.  The guarantee period in both single and joint annuities cannot be shorter
than  5 years.94
In order to maximize coverage of dependents  and insure them against  loss of income due to
the  death of a breadwinner,  the  law mandates  a selection  of annuity  or restricts  individual
choice  in  several  cases.  If an insured individual  is married,  a  single  annuity is not allowed
unless  the  spouse is  also entitled  to  a second pillar  annuity.  If both spouses  are  entitled,
they  can  choose  a  single  annuity,  but  both  must approve  that  choice.  If the  spouse  is
younger  than  50,  the  insured  individual  can  not chose  a  joint annuity.95 In  that case  an
individual can only have single  annuity with guarantee,  with a spouse being designated  as an
beneficiary.  Insured person with an adolescent children  must designate  the adolescent  as a
beneficiary until he/she reaches  18 years, or in the period of minimum 5 years.
Mandatory  lifetime  annuities  from  the  second  pillar  must  be calculated  based  on  unisex
tables,  i.e.  female life expectancy  equalized with male.96 The implication of using of unisex
tables  in Croatia  would be  a  10  percentage  points  redistribution  of annuity  from men  to
women.97 On the contrary, pension products drawn from the voluntary system can be based
on the gender-specific  tables.
Annuities and other pension products have to be provided by pension insurance companies,
separate legal entities prohibited to offer other insurance or financial products.  Such a strict
requirernent was introduced in order to prevent  cross-subsidization  between insurance and
financial products which was expected  if existing insurance  companies  and banks had been
allowed  to  offer  pension  insurance.  Furthermore,  the  Government  separated  pension
insurance  from other types of insurance with  the intention  of supervising it separately.  In
contrast  to other insurance  products, second pillar annuities are fully guaranteed by the state,
and investment limits are more strict.
94  The purpose of the guarantee  period is to provide certain income  to the designated  beneficiary,
survivors in most cases,  in case of the insured's  death.  Since  probability of death  is low in the first
several  years,  allowing  for  a  guarantee  period  shorter  than  5 years  would  serve  its  purpose  only
hrrnited  cases.
95  In that case, a reduction in  the level of joint annuity would be significant,  since the life expectancy
of the survivor would be high.
96  Use cf unisex tables  is thepractice in the majority of EU  countries and  the relevant  directive  of
the EU.  Candidate countries for EU accession have adopted this as a standard.
97  Prnor to  forwarding  the Annuities  Law to the Parliament,  the Croatian  Government  had several
discussions  on  how  to  reduce  longevity  risk.  Specifically,  the  working  groups  focused  on two
options, variable mortality tables accompanied  by survivor or life-indexed bonds (Blake, Burrows  and
Orszag,  1999)  and group  annuities,  as  a method  of reducing  the  longevity  risk  and the  common
practice  of pension  insurers  that  tend  to  ex-ante  reduce  the risk  by pricing  annuities  lower  than
implied  ander  current  mortality  tables.  However,  it  was  assessed  that  the  concepts  were  too
complicated  to  be  introduced  in  the  law  at  the  initial  stage  of the  second  pillar.  Consequently,
longevity risk for pension insurance companies in Croatia remains high.
55The literature  advocates  merging pension and life insurance  to ensure adequate risk pooling
and overall risk reduction.98 In Croatia, however,  the legislation on life insurance anticipates
separate  life insurance  companies,  but only  for companies  incorporated  after enactment  of
the law. Although  existing insurance  companies  that offer life insurance are required  legally
to  separate  life  insurance  from  other insurance  products,  few  insurance  companies  have
done so.99 Establishment of pension insurance companies may be a  catalyst to speed up the
process  of  resolving  controversies  in  the  insurance  market  and,  ultLmately,  possible
consolidation of the life and pension insurance markets.
There  were  many  complants  from  the  commercial  sector  against  creation  of  separate
pension insurance companies, as  the base  capital invested would not yield returns for a long
period of time before the annuity payments  kick off.  In order to address  this concern,  the
Law  on  Annuities  regulated  that  the  pension  insurance  companies  would  be  annuity
providers  for the second  pillar and  that pension program providers  for the voluntary pillar
in which the potental clients can be served in the first calendar year.  The law also envisaged
low  base  capital  for  pension  insurance  companies  of  5  million  Kuna  (around  USD
600,000),  which  increases  by  1 million  Kuna  with  each  1,000  contracts  issued  by  the
company.  Each company thus has an opportunity to pay-in the base capital in proportion to
its business  activity in the industry.
As indicated earlier, annuities  drawn from the second pillar will be indexed by  CPI, while in
the voluntary  system  the indexation  rule is established  in the contract.  The choice includes
no  indexation,  price  indexatLon,  or  exchange  rate  indexation,  with  possible  combinations
between price and exchange rate indices  .'°
Actarial  reserves  of a pension insurance  company can  be invested  in the  following  assets
and up to following limits:
*  short term T-bills issued by Republic of Croatia and NBC (no limit);
*  government bonds (no limit);
*  other securities issued or guaranteed  by Republic of Croatia (maximum 10 percent);
*  bonds issued by local governments and municipalities  (no limit);
*  corporate  bonds traded  at organized  markets  (maximum 5  percent  per issuer  and
affiliates);
*  mortgage bonds  (maximnum  50 percent  of value of real estate backing up the bond
issue);
98  Davis, 2000; Laboul,  1998.
99  Law  on  Insurance,  Official  Gazette,  46,  1997.  In  addition,  insurance  companies  offer  life
insurance  products  which  resemble  pension  products,  such  as  fixed-period  life  insurance  which
upon expiration  (survival)  can  be  converted  to  lifetime  annuities,  which  is neither  regulated  nor
supervised through the insurance laws.
100  Discussion in  the Government  and Parliament  on indexation of annuities  resembled that in the
literature  (Lindeman,  Rutkowski  and  Sluchynskyy, 2000).  The issues  under consideration were real
pension  at  retirement  and  death  (declining  pattern  in  the  fixed  annuity  system,  or  flat  in  price-
indexed),  and economic  stability  (inflation). It was concluded  that the risk of inflation  exceeded the
benefit of declining real wage pattern  ('one  dies poorer than when she retires')  and  price indexation
was introduced in the law.
56*  real estate (maximum  5 percent);,
*  stocks traded at organized markets (maximum  5 percent  per issuer and affiliates);
*  bank deposits  (maximum 5 percent);
*  stakes in open and shares in closed investment  funds (maximum 20 percent,  and 5
percent  per fund);
*  price-indexed government bonds (minimum 50 percent);
*  price-indexed local government and municipal bonds (maximum 20 percent); and
*  price-indexed  corporate,  price-indexed  mortgage  and  other  price-indexed  bonds
traded at organized markets  (maximum 20 percent).
Investment limits aimed to ensure adequate  dcversification  of actuarial reserves require that a
maxunum  of 5 percent of pension  fund assets  can be mvested in one issuer, including the
issuei's  affilhated  companies.  This limit does  not apply  to investment in government  and
local govrernment bonds.  Pension insurance companies are also prohibited from investing in
secunties  of an  insurance  company  as  well  as  in  any  affiliated  person  to  the  insurance
compan  y.
A pension insurance company can  charge only an up-front  fee of no more than 5%  of total
accumulation  transferred  from the pension  fund  to the  pension insurance  company.  If a
surplus in the technical reserves occurs  exceeding 15% of future liabilities, the excess surplus
has to be distributed to annuitants in proportion to their annuity levels.
Unlike  the  low  level  of guarantees  in  the  accumulation  stage,  in  the  payout  stage  a  full
guarantee by the state is ensured for annuities  in the mandatory system.  Voluntary pension
products are not guaranteed by the state.  Instead, pension insurance companies are required
to maintain adequate guarantee  funds and statutory reserves.
4.3. Market developments in 2002
Formaticon  of the  pension  market  in  Croatia  commenced  in  October  2001  with  the  first
temporary  authorizations  of  mandatory  fund  management  companies  by  HAGENA.1 'O
Mandatory  pension  fund companies  started  intensive  marketing campaigns  attempting  to
attract  as  many  members  as  possible.  HAGENA  and REGOS  initiated  the  process  of
registration of individual affiliation in November 2001,  one-and-a-half months ahead of the
start of second pillar contributions in order to minimize queues and reduce peaks during the
affiliation  process.102  By January  2002,  when the  legal requirement  to choose a mandatory
pension  fund  commenced,  HAGENA  had  authorized  seven  mandatory  pension  fund
companies  and licensed  seven corresponding  mandatory  pension  funds,  listed in  the  table
below.  In addition, it had licensed three  custodian  banks, respecting  the legal requirement
101 Temporary  authorizations were issued due to delays in licensing the custodian banks. Permanent
authorizations were issued in December 2001  (Official Gazette,  115, 2001, and also www.hagena.hr).
102  Initiating  early registration  of affiliation was also  significant  for earning public confidence  m the
privacy and the regularity of the process which  REGOS  outsourced to the Financial Agency which
had all the necessary  IT resources  and a widespread  national network  of counters. By January 2002,
some  300,000  members  chose  their pension  fund  without  any queues  or  delays  and no  reported
irregularities  at counters.
57that  the  custodian  bank must  not be  affiliated  to  any  of the  pension  fund  management
companies.0  The selection period  for affiliates  younger than 40 ended on March  31,  2002
with 620,000 mandatory  affiliates  (or 87 percent  of total) having exercised individual choice
of  a second pillar fund.  The remaining  90,000  affiliates below 40 years  of age that did not
make a selection were randomly  distributed  to existing funds  by REGOS  in proportion  to
the market share of each  fumd.  By end May 2002, about 150,000  insured people between 40
and 50  years  of age  - i.e.  some  34 percent  of insured in  that age  group  - chose  the new
system,  resulting in a total of 870,000 second pillar participants  at the end of choice period,
June  2002.  Due  to  very  strong  growth  in  employment  in  the  second  half of 2002,  the
number  of second  pillar  participants  increased  to 938,310  at the  end of December  2002
raising  thus  the  second  pillar  participation  rate  to  64  percent.104 Market  shares  for
mandatory funds as of December 2002 were as follows:
Table 4.2.: Market share by fund management company in second pillar,
May and November 2002.
Mandatory  Major shareholders  Net assets - Market  Members  - Market  Market
pension  muil.  kuna  share  - December  share  share
fund  December  assets  2002*  members  members
2002*  Decembe  December  mid-May
r 2002*  2002*  2002
A-Z  Allianz, Zagreba&a  859  42.1%  371,859  39.6%  39.78%
Banka
Raiffeisen  Raiffeisen  Bank  617  30.3%  303,757  32.3%  31.80%
PBZ-  Privredna Banka  350  17.3%  155,520  16.6%  16.65%
Croatia  Zagreb, Croatia
Osiguranje








Union of Raihways  .
Erste  Erste Bank,  49  2.4%  23,554  2.5%  2.52%
Steiermarkische Bank,
EBRD
HA-jedan  KD Holding, Fima,  7  0.3%  3,431  0.4%  0.40%
Aurum Osiguranje,
Trade Union of Public
Employees
Sources: www.mirovinskareforma.com:  *Hagenin Monutor,  12, 2002; www.haena.hr.
103  Despite  strong  opposition  against  such  a  strong affiliation  condition  for  custodian  banks  by
financial institutions, the process ended up without problems.  Licenses were issued to  HVB Croatia,
Hypo Alpe Adria Bank and Hrvatska Postanska Banka.
204  According  to  Croatian Employment  Bureau,  in  the period  May-November  more  than 90,000
individuals assumed some form of employment. See at www.hzz.hr.
58Comparison of the December  2002 market shares with the corresponding market shares  as
of  ihe  end-May  2002  indicates  that  the  market  structure  has  remained  unchanged.
According to Regos, only 30,000 individuals  exercised the legal opportunity for a free switch
in  2  002.  In  the  second  half  of  2002  the  intensity  of  marketing  activities  dropped
signficantly.  Apart  from  similar  portfolios  in  the  pension  funds,  the  low  frequency  of
switches  can  partly  be  explained  by  heavy  spending  on  marketing  in  the  initial  affiliation
period  which  discouraged  further  spending  to  win  over  the  members.'0 5 Market  shares
indicate  a  very  high industry  concentration  with  first  three  funds  absorbing  89  percent  of
second pillar participants.  Such a market structure is an indication that the industry is likely
to undergo  a phase of concentration  and integration m the near future with the number of
funds falling from seven to either three or four.
In the period February - April 2002, second pillar contributions were regularly transferred to
HAGENIA's  temporary account in the National  Bank of Croatia, earning the NBC discount
rate  of 5.9  percent.  This  so  called  "parking  period"  was  endorsed  by the Government  in
January 2002 in order to provide additional  tume to ensure well-functioning technical support
to the  second pillar, and to avoid problems  in the transition  period  caused  by the parallel
reform  of  the  payments  system  in  Croatia.  In  addition,  the  Government  decided  that
transfer of money to individual  accounts  during the  period of initial  fund  selection  would
not be considered  fair to those mdividuals that  had not selected a fund on their own, nor to
pension  fund  managers  that  were  at  lower  stages  of  technical  preparation  due  to  late
authorizations.  The decision was well accepted  by second pillar participants, who earned the
same rate of return independent of their affiliation  and selection  dates.  At the end of April
2002, 71 percent of total accumulated  funds were transferred  from the temporary account to
individual accounts,  along with the list  of individuals  that selected a particular  fund.  While
the  regular  monthly  contributions  in  the  period  May-December  have  been  transferred  in
time,  thLe backlog of still unresolved fund transfer from the "parking period"  was reduced to
less than 2 percent.  At the end of December 2002,  total funds accumulated  in the second
pillar stood at 1.86 billion kuna, while the total net asset value reached 2.04 billion.'06
Prior  to  and  during  the  initial  affiliation  period,  marketing  activities  were  intensive.'0 7
Although  most marketing  strategies  were  based  on  a  combination  of direct  and indirect
marketing,  indirect  marketing  was  dominant.  No  strong  correlation  between  direct
marketing and market share was  observed, even for funds managed by companies with trade
105  In addition,  mandatory  funds  should reach  required 80,000 members  for  the first  time by end
2003, which gives the management companies time to recuperate  and prepare a strategy for 2003.
106  HAGENA, 2002.  Simulations  in this paper forecasted  total accumulation in the second pillar in
2002 of 1,8 billion.  The actual figure was higher due  to unexpectedly  higher employment  figures in
2002.
107  Marketing activities of most pension funds significantly dropped in April 2002 when the selection
period  foz  mandatory  participants  ended,  and until June  2002  focused on  marketing  targeted  to
insured people between  40  and 50 years of age.  Targeted marketing was  successful and had resulted
in  an  increase  of participation  of the  40-50  cohort  from  23%  to  32%,  ie.  some  50,000  more
members, mainly those closer to 40 years of age, with higher incomes and longer service.
59unions  in  the  shareholding  structure.'08 In  comparison  with  pension  reforms  which
emphasized  direct  marketing,  there  have  been  two  factors  in  Croatia  that  prevented  the
problems  with  fund agent  and  employer  pressure  on workers  found in a number of other
countries.  The  first one is privacy  of fund selection, with exclusion  of agents  enforced  by
REGOS.  The second is dominance  of commercial  banks in the financial  system in Croatia
and  their dominance  in the  shareholding  structure  of fund  management  companies.  The
brand  name  of the  bank involved  in  the  fund management  company  appeared  to be the
most important  factor  for  fund selection.  Nevertheless,  total expenditures  on marketing,
sales  and  advertising were  impressive,  estLmated  at around  120  mil Kuna  ($15  million)  or
around 32 percent  of the total charter capital of the industry, as shown in Table 4.3:
Table 4.3. Marketing expenditures  during initial affiliation process
Mandatory  Marketing  Marketing expenditures  per  Marketing
pension fund  expenditures  per  affiliate,  % of annual inflow  expenditures,  %
affiliate,  kn*  per average  of charter
affiliate*  capital**
A-Z  63  2.3%  22.1%
Raiffeisen  92  3.3%  30.6%
PBZ-Croatia  72  2.6%  23.8%
Plavi fond  389  13.9%  48.6%
Helios  905  32.3%  45.9%
Erste  1000  35.7%  50.0%
HA-iedan  3000  107.1%  19.2%
Industry average  151  5.4%  31.9%
* Source: www.mirovinskareforma.com:  www.hagena.hr.  **Estimate  of the authors,  average  annual
inflow per affiliate estimated at 2,800 kn.
The numbers  indicate  that the industry spent  an average  of 151  Kuna per affiliate,  or  5.4
percent  of the total annual inflow to an average second pillar account.  In the funds with the
highest market shares,  marketing expenditures  per affiliate  ranged between 2.3  percent and
3.3 percent of annual inflow, while in  those with low market shares,  these costs  even rose
above 100 percent of annual inflow.  As a result of spending so heavily on marketing,  some
fund management companies reached the limit of 50 percent of charter capital, which might
require  a  subsequent  capital increase  if the revenue  from  fees proves to be insufficient  to
cover the operating costs of the companies.'09
After having received the accumulated  second pillar  funds for their members  in April 2002,
pension fund management companies  have been faced with lack of adequate  capital market
instruments  eligible for pension funds investment.  Investment in domestic equity is limited
to first quotation, while  corporate and municipal fixed income instruments are virtually non-
existent."'  Although  the  supply  of government  debt  instruments  on  the  market  was
sufficient  for  pension  fund  operations  (with  a  maximum  maturity  of  7  years),  the
108  Precise  data on sales agent by pension fund have not been available.
109  A mandatory pension fund management company must always maintain base capital of at least 20
million Kuna.
110  Currently, there are only four companies  listed in the first quotation,  Plhva, Podravka, Dom Fond
and Viktor Lenac, with only the first three on the list with active trading. For details visit www.zse.hr.
60Government  decided to increase  the supply with a  12-year, Euro-denominated  issue of £500
million m three bi-annual  tranches  and a  coupon of 6.875  percent,  designated  for pension
funds and other institutional investors.  Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance, with the issue
of the first tranche, offered  an inutial discount of 30 bps, which produced  exceptionally high
yields on these bonds.  As a result of this bond issue and the decline in first-quotation  equity
prices in May, June and September 2002, the pension  funds placed a majority of their assets
in domestic government bonds while avoiding  investment in domestic and foreign equity as
well in foreign fixed income instruments:m
Table 4.4. Portfolio  structure of Mandatory Pension Funds in Croatia
end November 2002*
Asset: structure  Amount  %
(mil.  kuna)
Domestic  assets  1,802.3  96.95
Euity + GDR  82.6  4.44
Government bonds  1,537.9  82.74
Short term govt. and NBC fixed income instruments  20.6  1.11
Deposits  3.0  0.16
Corporate bonds  0  0
Municipal  bonds  0  0
Open investment funds  0  0
Closed investmnent funds  6.9  0.37
Cash  129.1  6.94
Other  22.2  1.19
Foteigassets  56.7  3.05
Eqility  3.5  0.19
Government bonds  30.3  1.63
Closed investment  funds  22.9  1.23
Deposits  0.0  0.0
TOTAL ASSETS  1,859.0  100.0
Source: Hagenin Monitor 2, 2002.
'Total  net asset value of accumulated  funds in the second pillar in December stood at 2,037 million,
but the detailed portfolio structure has not been published at the time of completion of this paper.
Favorable initial pricing of the  12-year government bonds and the development at the fixed
income rnarkets  in  2002 lead  to realization  of high  nommial rates  of return in all pension
funds:
11 For more details on the issue see www.mfin.hr:  www.bankamagazine.hr  and www.hagena.hr.
61Table 4.5  Gross Rates of Return of Pension Funds in  2002*
Pension fund/average  Gross RoR  2002 (%)
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vCEX**  11.1
* Gross rates of return computed from accounting units of the funds
** MIREX is an industry average index compiled and maintained by HAGENA112
Having in mind that the second pillar contributions were earning the discount rate of 5.9%
in the  first  four months  of 2002,  the  exceptional  result was  achieved  through  an  annual
return  on  government  bonds  of  about  15%.1'3  In  the  same  period  consumer  prices
increased  by 2.2%, leaving thus  the real rate of return on 8.9%.  Consequently,  the success
fee for entire 2002 would, according to Hagena's regulation,  stand at 2.2%  of NAV, which is
more than double the regular NAV fee.  Total  deduction from NAV for NAV-related  fees
would thus reach  as high as 3% of NAV, which confirms  the findings of high  fee levels in
Croatian pension system.  Since  the funds were not active in the first five months  of 2002,
the success  fee  is likely be period-scaled  to seven months.  Even with this scaling,  the total
deduction would be as high as 2.1%  of assets.
Despite dynamic development in the second pillar, the voluntary funded system did not start
operations  in early 2002 as anticipated.  One reason was a delay in designing and publishing
the supplementary acts for the payout stage, namely for the pension programs.  As indicated,
pension programs  - prepared and offered by pension insurance companies - must be known
in advance for participation  in any  voluntary pension  fund.  By December 2002, there was
only  one  authorized  voluntary  pension  fund  management  company,  one  pension  fund
insurance  company,  one  licensed  voluntary  pension  fund,  and  one  authorized  voluntary
pension program.2
112  Detailed methodology on MIREX can be found at www.hagena.hr.
113  Sending a positive  signal at the beginning  of second pillar operations  was probably intentional.
However, it is unlikely that such a level of generosity on the expense of taxpayers was equally desired.
ll4  Raiffeisen voluntary pension  fund is an open pension fund with a pension program offering only
single  life annuities.  However,  two licenses  for establishing  open voluntary  pension  funds, and one
62Transparency  is an important  consideration  for every  funded  pension  system.  Six months
after transferring  the second pilar funds  to individual  accounts,  the  Croatian  second pillar
remains insufficiently  transparent, with  only the basic data such  as total accumulation  in the
second  pillar  and  the  unit  fund  values  being  publicly  available.  This  concem  relates  to
several  aspects of the system, including the total number of second pillar affiliates and total
accuiLnalation on the temporary account;  breakdown of affiliates  by funds; asset structure by
funds; and  other  features  that commonly  have  a  strong  influence  on individual  decisions.
Improvements  in this  segment are needed for further promotion  of the multi-pillar pension
system and strengthening of public confidence.
license  for  establishing  a  pension  insurance  company  have  been  pending  in  Hagena.  Interest  in
establishing corporate and occupational pension funds has also been very high.
635. Forecasts for the Future
5.1. Long term forecasts  of the new system
Current  estimates indicate  that almost  16  percent of total  population in  2002 is  older than
65.  Correspondingly,  one of standard indicators of pension system dependency, the share of
older than  65 relative to those of working age  (15-64)  in 2002 stands  at internationally  high
24 percent, and is expected to deteriorate  over time to 36 percent in 2040
Deteriorating  demographics  will  have  a  double  negative  impact  on pension  parameters.
Even with assumed long-run improvement in the participation rate of 15-64 cohorts from 50
percent  in 2002 to 60 percent  in 2040,  total national  employment  and insured persons  is
expected to peak in 2016-2018 and decline afterwards  (Figure  5.1.).  On the other hand, the
trend of beneficiaries  will  become  flatter due to parametric  changes in the  first pillar.  The
ratio  of contributors  to  beneficiaries  is  expected  to  gradually  decline  from  1.38  to  1.3  in
period 2016-2018 and somewhat faster afterwards to a level close to 1 by around 2040.'"
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115  The underlying demographic assumptions  include  an annual decline in population of 0.22 percent
gradually lowerng to  0.32 percent per year and a gradually raising participation rate from 50 percent
in 2002 to 60 percent in 2017, constant afterwards.
64The effects  of the change  in PAYG parameters  in the period  1999-2001  and the forecasted
developments  by  the  year  2040  are  presented  in  Figure  5.2.  A major  slowdown  in  net
increase  of pensioners  from an average  of 32,000 per year in the period 1995-98  to around
15,000 in  2001  and 2002 was interrupted  by a  "rush to pension"  in  1999, when the number
of pensioners  increased by 62,500.  This was primarily due to early retirement under the old
law whLch was allowed in 1999.  The reduction in the net inflow of pensioners  mn 2000 was a
result of extended requirements  for early retirement  and cancellation  of certain  temporary
disability categories.
]Figure 5.2  New pensioners in PAYG and multipillar schemes,  1995-2040
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The strLcture of pensioners  in the next 40 years will change gradually in favor of the mixed
system participants  (Figure  5.3).  By 2012, the net inflow of pensioners to the PAYG system
is expected to approach zero due to gradual changes in the PAYG parameters.  In 2012, the
first cohort of combined pensioners should start receiving pensions  from two pillars.  Unless
the PAYG parameters  change in the meantime, most of the two-pillar  2012 new pensioners
would  consist of women who chose  to enter into  the  two-pillar  system.  From  2012, net
entry  to the  second  pillar  should  rapidly increase,  as well  as  the net  exit  from the PAYG
system.  Those  in both pillars would  outnumber  PAYG-only participants  by around  2036.
The  net  effect  would  be  a  moderate  growth  in  total  system  beneficiaries  by  around  20
percent lbetween 2010 and 2040, as shown in the previous figure.
65Figure 5.3  Structure of pensioners by source of pension, 2000-2040
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The  gradual  shift  in  the  structure  of  pensioners  will  be  reflected  in  pension  pillars
substitution,  as  shown  on  Figure  5.4.  With  moderately  optimistic  macroeconomic
assumptions,  i.e. growth rate in GDP of 4 percent  (2003-2009),  3.5  percent (2010-2012),  3
percent thereafter; mflation rate of 3 percent, growth  rate in real wages  of 3 percent , gross
real rate  of return to second pillar accounts in the accumulation  stage of 4 percent  and the
gross  real rate of return  in  the payout  stage  of  3  percent,  total PAYG  expenditures  will
decline  to around  8.2 percent  of GDP in 2040, with 5 percent  allocated for  PAYG-only
pensions  and  3.2  percent  for  basic  pensions  for  two-pillar  participants.  Assuming  the
relatively modest  contribution rate  to the second pillar of 5  percent does not change, total
payout of annuities by 2040 will rise to 3.6 percent  of GDP.
With indexation  rules  established  by the  Pension  Insurance  Act,  the  PAYG  average  net
replacement rate would continue declining from the current 47.6 percent to about 38 percent
until 2012 when the second pillar starts  paying annuities  (Figure  5.5).  Afterwards,  a gradual
increase of the initial net combined replacement rate would be achieved.  Since the simulation
assumes a high 3 percent  real rate of return in the payout stage, the result for the two-pillar
partcipants  is  far from spectacular  and indicates  that the second pillar contibution and/or
the retirement age should be further raised if a higher pensions are wanted.'16
116  Under a more optimistic scenario, with real wage growth of 4 percent, rate of return of 5 percent
in the accumulation  period and 4 percent in  the payout period, combined  replacement  rate rises to
only  43  percent  by  2040.  On  the  contrary,  less  optimistic  macroeconomic  conditions  (real  wage
growth 2 percent,  3 percent return  in accurnulatton  period  and 1 percent  in payout)  would  yield a
combmed replacement rate of less than 35 percent.
66Figure 5.4  Pension spending for different components of system, 2002-2040
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Figure 5.5  New replacement rates 2000-2040
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67In terms of  the structure of the indlvidual  multipillar pension, PAYG substitution with the
second  fully  funded  pfilar  is  expected  to  be  gradual  (Figure  5.6).  Based  on  the  same
macroeconomic  assumptions, with current contribution rate,  the second pillar would  grow
to the  size  of the  PAYG  pillar  by  2040.  If faster pillar  substitution  and  more  favorable
replacement  rates  are  desired, the  contribution  rate to the second pillar  would need to be
raised above the current 5 percent." 7
Figure 5.6  Composition of pension income,  2012-2040
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Given  the  demographic  and  macroeconomic  assumptions  described  above,  a  constant
contribution  rate  to  the  second  pillar  of  5  percent  of  gross  wage  and  the  fees  set  at
maximum levels, the  size of the second pillar would grow steadily to 15 percent  of GDP by
2015 during the period of dotrinance of accumulation over the payout (Figure 5.7). The start
of payouts  would  cause  the  second  pillar growth  rates  to  diminish  until  2030 when it  is
expected to  peak at 21.6 percent of GDP. From that point,  payouts from the second pillar
would  be greater  than  inflows  and the  second pillar  would  start to shrink  gradually  as a
share of GDP.
117  For  example,  a  second  pillar  contribution  rate  of 7 percent  and  the  same  macroeconomic
assumptions would yield a  replacement rate that would reach 47 percent by 2040.
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5.2. Trairnsition cost and its financing
Divertin  5 percentage  points of the conttibution  payrnents  for the second pillar participants
wvill result in a financing gap for the first pfllar. Furthermore, Croatia is burdened by a relatively
high  budiget  deficit  of 7  percent  of GDP  (general  government,  excluding  privatization
revenucs)  and  foreign  debt/GDP  ratio  of 55  perccnt  of  GDP,  'widh  total  public  debt
standing  at  39 percent of GDP. The fiscal  imnplications  of introducing  the  second pilar is
thus of  critical importance.  The shortfiall in first pilar revcnues would have to be financed
by additional financing of the first pilar. The size and path of additional transfers depend on
how  much  of the  additional  deficit  is  to  be  financed  by  PAYG  savings,  current  budget
(including ptivatization  revenues)  or debt."'  The underlying  financing ptinciple  promoted
by the Government  -was to achieve  a high level of intergencrational  equity by spreading  thle
transitioi  costs  similarly  across  generations,  suggesting  a  rniixed  strategy  on  filling  the
financing  gap  for the  first  pillar.`19  A  key  element  of this  is  expected  to  be  expenditure
compression in the first pilla  from the imnpact of the  1998 reformns.
1t8  Holzn-iann  (1998)  and Lindemzan, Rutkowski and Sluchynskiyy,  (2000).
119  The public mformation  camnpaign was  carried out with a strong generational equality argument.
69The  expected  fiscal  saving  in the  PAYG  system,  shown  in Figure  5.9,  is determined  as  a
difference  between  the required  transfer from the budget to cover budgetary obligations  for
privileged  categories  and the  required  transfers  from  the budget  taking  into  account  the
effects  of the  1998  Pension  Insurance  Act.  Legally  required  transfers  continue  to  decline
from  6 percent  to 4 percent of GDP due to Swiss  indexation of all benefits.  Offsetting this
continued  financing cost is a decline in the required transfers to the PAYG system excluding
the  second  pillar,  which  would  decline  at  a  faster  pace  due  to  tightening  the  PAYG
parameters  in addition to the mndexation pattern.  The net impact should be savings from the
PAYG pension reform,  which are  estimated to increase  to 1 percent of GDP by 2012  and
peak at 3 percent of GDP around 2035.
Fiscal  saving  in  the  PAYGO  system  emerges  from  direct  (or explicit)  reduction  in  future
benefits  through introduction  of the basic pension  for  future participants  in both mandatory
pillars and indirect (or implicit)  benefit reduction that result from changes in all other PAYGO
parameters.  Explicit PAYGO  savings  would kick off in 2012 with the  first payment in basic
pensions and would gradually increase reaching the level of 20 percent of total PAYGO savings
(Figure 5.9).
Figure 5.8  Savings in the PAYG scheme,  2000-2040
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Transition cost is defined as a difference between the total contribution to the second pillar and
the total savings in the PAYG pillar (Figure 5.10).  In other words it is assumed  that the total
pension contribution  rate will  remain unchanged and the savings in the PAYG pillar from the
1998  reform  would  be  fully used  to finance  the  shortfall  in the  PAYG pillar.'20  Expected
120  If the savings in  the PAYG pillar would only partially be used to finance the second  pillar or if
the contribution  rate would be reduced, the transition  cost would increase by the same amount.
70PAYG  savmgs  would  outgrow  the  second  pillar  contributions  by  2016.  Total  cumulative
transition cost in the first decade of second pillar operation would thus amount to  7.85 percent
of GD]?,  while  in  the second  decade it would  fade  away.  For  the entire period  of positive
transition  cost 2002-2016,  the transition  cost would amount  to 9  percent  of GDP.121 If the
projections  for the 2002-2040 period are calibrated for the reduction in privileged pensions that
were legislated in October 2001  and enacted in early 2002, PAYG savings would outgrow the
second pillar costs  in 2012.122  In that case the total transition cost would  amount to only 3.6
percent of GDP  (realized in the  first decade)  with net  savings  of 3.9  percent of GDP in the
second decade.
Figure 5.9 Composition  of PAYGO  savings
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According  to  the  Pension  Insurance  Act,  funds  to  cover  the  transition  deficit  have  to be
transferred  from  the central  budget to the PAYG  system.  Since  funds would  originate  from
general  revenues,  their  sources  would  depend  on  current  economic  policy.  Investment
regulation  for the pension funds requires that at least 50 percent of assets have to be placed in
long  tern  government  bonds,  which  consequently  implies  that at  least  50 percent  of the
transition  cost may be debt-financed.  Financing the transition cost might also be linked with
121  If the assumption  of  gradually improving compliance  from 83 percent  to 95 percent is applied,
the range of positive  transition  cost shrinks  to 4.2 percent  and the  total cumulative  cost in the  first
decade drops to only 3 percent
122  Law on  Changes  in  the Law on  Maximum  Pension  (Official  Gazette  82,  2001)  and Law on
Changes  in the Law on Budget Execution  for 2001  (Official  Gazette  82, 2001)  is expected  to yield
net savings  between  3 percent and 4 percent  of total PAYG expenditures,  or around 0.4 percent of
GDP equivalent.
71fiurther privatization.  Sources  for  funding  the  pension  system  costs  may  be  found in  the
portfolios of the Privatization  Fund and the Pension Fund, assets  of pubhc companies  to be
privatized in the following period.
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Transition cost estimated here is significantly lower than the transition cost estimates in 1999
which ranged between 20 percent and 30 percent of GDP in the first two decades of second
pilar  operations.  Such  differences  in  estimates  are  due  to:  (i)  lower  than  expected
participation  in  the  second  pilar of generation  40-50,"  (ii) overestimated  effective  gross
wage  that would serve as a base  for second pillar  contribution,  and (iii)  stagnating nominal
wages  in  early  2002; and  (iv)  the low participation  rate resulted from a nationwide  detailed
and  targeted  dissemination  of pension  calculations  to  generation  40-50  which  rationally
based their choice on these indicative figures." TM
Finally,  the  favorable  path  and  low  level  of the  transition  cost,  along  with  low  expected
replacement rate for two-pillar participants  indicates that the contribution  rate to the second
pillar would have to be revisited and eventually increased in the near future.  The path of the
tansition  cost,  particularly  in  combination  with  higher  compliance  and  savings  in  the
privileged  pensions  system,  suggests  that further  increase  in the rate  could be  sustained  by
fiscal policy.
123  Estimates  relied on  an expected  50 percent  participation  rate, while the actual  paricipation  by
June 2002 was 23 percent.
124  The computer program  to calculate  individual  benefit from the mandatory  system is available  at
www.HAGENA.hr.
726. C:onclusions,  Outstanding Issues, and Lessons
6.1.  Conclusions and outstanding issues
The multi-pillar reform introduced in Croatia in recent years  represents a thorough overhaul
of a  system which had become unsustainable  and a source of such great fiscal pressure that it
threateried overall macroeconomic  stability.  The PAYG reforms of 1998 - supplemented by
further improvements in the system in recent years - should contribute to a more sustainable
pubbc pillar,  and  has  also  made multi-pillar  reform  possible  even  in a  fiscally  constrained
envuonment.  The  funded  pillar  reform  can  also  be  Judged  a  success  on  the  limited
experience  to date, and has clearly benefited  from lessons of earlier reforms  in neighboring
countries.  It has also  proved  an important  catalyst  for broader  reforms in  the system  for
repotiing  and  enforcing  social  contributions  and  individual  income  taxes  which  on  early
experience  have  had  a significant  impact on revenue  performance.  Overall,  experience  to
date  suggests that the Croatian multi-pillar  reform is proving  as one of the more successful
in the region, in part because  of the caution of policymakers  in ensuring an adequate design
period.  However, more time is needed to assess the operations of the funded pillars and the
impact on capital market development in the country.
Despite  the generally  positive assessment of the reform to date,  there remain  a number  of
outstanclng  issues  in  the  Croatian  pension  system  which  are  likely  to  require  further
attention from policy makers in the short to medium term.  These relate to all three pillars of
the new system, and include the following:
For the PAYG system,  the  1998 reform left several  important issues  unaddressed  or not
adequately addressed,  so that the link between  contributions and benefits was still in need of
strengthening.  While there has been partial progress  on some of the issues outlined below,
further adjustments in the public pillar will be necessary for the following:
*  Minimum pensions still remain too generous  and in actuarial  imbalance with the minimum
required contribution base.  This imbalance  stimulates contributions at minimum bases.
There has been  preliminary  discussion  of future  adjustment  in this area  that deals  with
the  issue  more  coherently,  through  increasing  the  minimum  contribution  base  or
reducing  the minimum pension decrement, and adjusting  to the point where the pension
and social assistance  systems  interface.  This would need to be done in a manner than
does not undermine the positive old age poverty impact of the 1998 reforms;
*  While  the  1998  reform  substantially  improved  the  situation  with  early  retirement,  the
annual decrements for each year of early retirement still remain well below what actuarial
analysis  would suggest  are  reasonable.  The Pension Institute  has commissioned  more
detailed  actuarial  work on  the  subject  to  determine  the  appropriate  adjustment,  but
prelirinary  analysis  of the  authors  suggests  than  an annual  decrement  of 5-6  percent
may be appropriate,  against the current adjustment of 3.6 percent;
*  The  system  will  continue  to be  subject to pressure  from pivileged pensions and use of the
pension system to deal with labor  adjustment.  While recent revisions in privileged pensions  are
welccme, further adjustments would  be desirable in  fiscal and equity terms; and
73*  Achieving passage and effective implementation  of the broadening of  the contribution base wiLl
be  an important  effort,  and  also help to  reduce  perverse  labor market  behavior  which
was an outcome of previous incentLves  to maximize non-wage  compensation.
For  the funded  pillars, experience  is obviously more limited to date and conclusions more
tentative, but already there  are  several elements  of the reform which appear to need further
revision and/or close monitoring to evaluate initial expenence.  They include:
*  The contribution rate to the secondpillar,  which from the forecasts  in Section 5 appears to be
too low to ensure  broadly consistent  total replacement rates on pensions  in the medium
term.  Given the apparent fiscal space for absorbing a somewhat higher transition deficit,
this  paper  recommends  that  the  Government  consider  raising  the  second  pillar
contribution rate in coming years  to at least 7 percent of payroll, the level that would be
consistent with current replacement rates on pensions;
*  The legislatedfees for funded pensions appear to be very high, complex,  and overly rigid in
a way that could act  as a  barrier to  entry for potential  fund managers.  This  has led to
high  administrative  costs  during  initial  implementation  relative  to  international
comparators.  The authors would recommend downward  adjustment in fee levels  (which
is happening in practice to some extent already in the market), allowing competition over
the success fee to minimize perverse incentives  for fund managers,  possible reduction in
the total number of fees to a more simple and flexible fee  structure, and consideration of
fund manager participation in the costs of REGOS (see below);
*  Close monitoring by HAGENA  of  portfolio concentration  wiUl  be required, in part to assess
the impact of placing primary responsibility for guarantees on fund managers;
Accessibility  and transparency  of data on second pillar  operations  needs  to be increased,  with
respect to affiliates,  total accumulations, unit values funds, and other information;
*  Portfolio restrictions on  voluntay pension funds should  be  relaxed.  This  is  already  under
consideration, and should be carried out as soon as feasible;
*  The  evolution  of volantay  pension find  programs needs  to be reviewed  and an assessment
made of the major reasons for the slower-than-expected  development of the sub-sector;
*  The  existence of a  separate regulatorfor  the pensions industy should  be evaluated  as part of
the  overall  Government  policy review  of financial  market regulation.  While  the trend
internationally  presently  is  towards  some  consolidation  of financial  market  or at  least
contractual  savings  regulation,  it may be  desirable  in the  short term in Croatia to allow
HAGENA  to carry out its initial operations  without the additional institutional demands
of negotiating a merger with other regulators;
*  The Government  will need to decide  thefwtut  role and structure of REGOS, particularly as
FINA is restructured  and overall consolidation of the revenue collection system matures.
There are a number of options, including a "big REGOS" which is merged with one part
of the restructured  FINA, or different models  of a "small REGOS"  which could either
remain  as a public institution with basic central account management functions  (possibly
financed  in  whole  or part  by  fund  managers  in  the  medium  term),  or  evolve  into  a
private  institution  owned  and  financed  by  fund managers,  along  the  lines of Mexico.
Presently, there  seems no agreed vision in Government  on these  questions, though  the
direction  should become  clearer as  decisions  are taken by 2003  on the restructuring  and
future functions of FINA; and
74*  The  institution of separate  pension insurance companies should also be evaluated as experience
deepens  to  assess  the  desirability  of separation,  and whether  or not it  contributes  to
undesirable unregulated behavior in parallel markets such as life insurance.
6.2.  Lessons of the Croatian reform
There  are several lessons which can  be drawn from the Croatian  reform to date, which are
important  despite being preliminary only at this point.  They include:
*  Combining PAYG andfundedpension reforms into a single reforrm  "package"  can be useful in
building support  for funded pension reforrm,  particularly  in countries  where public  faith
in the  first pillar has been undermined.  It also  suggests  that multi-pillar  reform can be
accomplished in a fiscally challenging environment if there is sufficient adjustment in the
PAYG system;
*  use of a central  cleainghouse, if well designed  and executed,  can assist in smooth and more
uniform implementation of the second pillar.  It may also facilitate broader consolidation
in public revenue reporting and enforcement;
*  the central clearinghouse  and its protection  of affiliate information  does appear to have
minimized abuses in pension  fund management  marketing seen in other  funded pension
reforms.  At the same time, overall fee levels remain high due to the problems with  fees
levels and structures identified above;
*  use  of a  central  clearinghouse  does  not automatically  result  in  administrative  cost
savings if the legislated  fee structure  is incorrectly and/or overly rigidly determined.
The  Croatian experience  also suggests  that closer  coordination  with fund managers
o,n  the  system  and individual  fund manager  data  needs  is required  to  ensure  that
central  account  management  achieves  the  intended  economies  of  scale  and  not
merely duplication  of account management  functions within the system;
*  those designing reforms need to think through carefully the implications  offee schedule
design for portfolio  concentration and unintended barriers to entry  for potential  fund
mnanagers.  Concerns  on  possible  portfolio  concentration  incentives  may  be
particularly  important  for  countries  such  as  Croatia  which  have  small and illiquid
equity markets and still-developing local long term debt markets;
*  a contribution  rate of 5 percent of payroll as in Croatia should be considered very much
a lower bound for a multi-pillar  system to provide a minimum  acceptable aggregate
replacement  rate.  While  others  in  the  region  have  started  with  lower  rates  (e.g.
Bulgaria  with  only  2  percent),  forecasts  for Croatia  suggest  that  this  needs  to be
increased  as rapidly  as possible to a level closer to 7-8 percent of payroll,  subject to
financing for the transition cost being available  from fiscal compression or debt; and
*  the Croatian  experience does not offer clear guidance on the single or multiple regulator
question.  However,  broader assessment of financial market and contractual  savings
regulation  in  Croatia  suggests  that  medium  term  consolidation  of regulation  for
contractual  savings  at  least  may  be  desirable  in  a  small  country  with  limited
regulatory capacity.
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Croatia's  transition toward  independence and the  market economy
in the  1990s exacerbated problems  in the  PAYG  DB  system  and
ultimately led to its financial collapse.  Although a comprehensive
three-pillar reform  was initiated in late 1995,  implementation  of the
reform  only began  in 1998 with an overhaul of  PAYG parameters,
including shifting to a German-style  points system.  Introduction of
the mandatory  and voluntary funded pillars was announced in 1  998
and implemented  in 2002.  The new system includes a privately-
managed  individual account scheme with a contribution  rate of 5
percent in addition to a downsized pay-as-you-go,  defined benefit
component.  This paper describes the design  of the  new system and
highlights areas where further refinements  are needed.
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